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hePreface, below, waswritten in 1997
when the intent was to publish the
then seven histories developed under
theArmyOral History Project. Subsequently,
a decision was made to delay publication.
By the time I retired from the Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Oper-
ations Research), ODUSA (OR), I found that
Walt Hollis, FS, had originally commissioned
Dr. Wilbur Payne, a well-known and highly
regarded Army operations analyst, on Wil-
bur’s retirement from his last Army position
as Director, TRADOC Operations Research
Activity (TORA). Unbeknown to any of us in
theODUSA (OR),Wilbur had completed two
interviews before passing away in 1990. The
subjects were Dr. Hugh Cole and Floyd Hill.
The tapes of those interviews were found by
Dr. Dan Willard when he was asked to go
through Wilbur’s papers and files by Mary
Farley, Wilbur’s widow. I had the tapes tran-
scribedand the transcriptions reviewedby the
two subjects who approved their publica-
tion. The added interviews brought the total
number of histories under the Army project
to 10. The interviewees were Hugh Cole,
MargaretEmerson,AbeGolub, FrankGrubbs,
Floyd Hill, Hugh Miser, George Schecter,
Nick Smith, Annette Stein, and Art Stein. As
ofnow, the followingwhohavediedareHugh
Cole, Abe Golub, Frank Grubbs, HughMiser,
George Schecter, Nick Smith, and Art Stein.
After my retirement from federal ser-
vice, I recommended that MORS pick up
the ‘‘baton’’ and perform additional oral
history interviews concentrating on pioneer
MORSians and early MORS Fellows of the
Society. MORS established the Oral History
Program in 1998 and has since captured
more than 50 oral histories of distinguished
MORSians and prominent members of the
military OR community.
This volume of MOR presents a Fore-
word written by Walt Hollis and two of the
above-mentioned oral histories: Art Stein
and Annette Stein. Mr. Arthur ‘‘Art’’ Stein,
FS,was the third President ofMORS, serving
from 1967 to 1968. Dr. Annette Stein, Art’s
wife and one of the human ‘‘computers’’
during World War II, worked for Dr. John
von Neumann. Dr. Bob Sheldon, FS, whom
I mentored in the MORS Oral History Pro-




The oral history project was assigned to
me by Mr. Walter W. Hollis, Deputy Under
Secretary of the Army (Operations Re-
search) in the winter-spring of 1992. His
initial guidance to me was to seek out sup-
port from other Army elements, most spe-
cifically the Center of Military History in
Washington, DC, and the Military History
Institute at the Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania. Together, Walt and
I developed a provisional list of candidates
for interview. Our criteria were simple: the
people we were looking for would have be-
gun their military analytic careers no later
than World War II and they should now
be ‘‘vertical, ambulatory, and cogent.’’ Up
to two of the last three, somewhat light-
hearted, criteria could be waived. As Walt
pointed out in his Foreword, we had already
lost many of the stalwart founders of the
practice of Army operations research. There
are still, fortunately, manywho still meet the
criteria. Somany, in fact, that the oral history
project has a rich trove of potential contribu-
tors. Because of time and money limitations
only seven people were interviewed for this
book.We hope that this little bookwill be but
the first and will open the door to many
more like it; time is of the essence if further
oral histories are to be gathered from the
Army founders.
Following Walt’s guidance, I met with
BG Harold Nelson, then Chief of Military
History, COL Thomas Sweeney, Chief, Mili-
taryHistory Institute, andDr. JamesWilliams,
then Director of the Oral History Program,
Military History Institute, and now Cura-
tor, Armor Museum at Fort Knox, Kentucky,
to develop a plan and methods for the oral
history project. Subsequently, Jim Williams
collaborated with me on development of
the Army OR Oral History project. Together
we developed a short information paper
used to introduce the project to interviewees
and help get the dialogue moving. We con-
ducted some of the interviews jointly, with
Jim taking the lead at the outset, while I
learned from his considerable experience.
Six of the seven histories are included
in this volume; the review of the seventh
by the interviewee was not completed be-
cause of complexities in the interview and
subsequent family problems. Maybe some
day that interview will be available for
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Drs. Annette Stein, Hugh Miser, and Nicholas
Smith; Ms. Margaret Emerson; and Messrs.
George Schecter and Arthur Stein. The last two
gentlemen are now, sad to say, deceased, result-
ing in great gaps in themilitary analysis commu-
nity. Hugh Miser and Nick Smith both began
their careers during World War II as members
of Army Air Forces operations analysis sections.
Later, both served with distinction, Hugh with
the new US Air Force and Nick with the Johns
Hopkins University Operations Research Office,
supporting the US Army. Annette and Art Stein
began their professional careers during World
War II at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Margaret
Emerson worked on the Army staff in the Penta-
gon during the War. George Schecter spent the
first half of his distinguished research and analy-
sis practice in the Army’s arsenal system. Jim
and I jointly interviewed the Steins and George
Schecter; I interviewed Margaret Emerson
and Nick Smith; and Hugh Miser was inter-
viewed by LTC Lawrence S. Epstein, an Army
Reserve officer working under our direction
for this project.
The lives presented in this book span awide
range of Army analysis activity and are a good
and interesting introduction to the origins of
Army operations research.
FOREWORD
From the time I was appointed Deputy Un-
der Secretary of the Army (Operations Research)
in 1980, I have been concerned with the heritage
of the practice of operations research in the
United States Army and in the larger defense
community.WhenDr.Wilbur P. Payne, a premier
Army operations analyst and the founder and
first occupant of this office, retired from full-time
service as a Senior Executive Service official, I
saw an opportunity to contribute to the record-
ing of our heritage. I prevailed upon Wilbur to
undertake interviewswith distinguished analysts
whose careers began during and just following
World War II, recognized as the beginning of
the modern practice we call operations research.
Sad to say, Wilbur became quite ill shortly after
our discussions and soon passed away, leaving
amajor gap in our community.WhenMr. Eugene
P. Visco, once a colleague of Wilbur’s at the Johns
Hopkins University Operations Research Office,
the Army central operations research organiza-
tion from 1948 to 1961, came under my direc-
tion in 1987, I saw fit to assign the oral history
task to him.
We realized that it was already too late to
capture the thoughts and personal recollec-
tions of many of the early leaders and contrib-
utors to Army analysis. Dr. Ellis A. Johnson,
founder and only Director of the ORO, was
no longer with us. Dr. Dorothy K. Clark, a fine
military historian and analyst who made
major inroads in the relationship between ca-
sualties and success on the battlefield and
who worked in the field in Korea, Vietnam
and Thailand, had passed away. No longer with
us were James W. Johnson, one of the architects
of pentagonal division, Dr. George Pettee and
Lynn Rumbaugh (the latter two were main
stays in helping Ellis Johnson design and de-
velop the ORO), and many other distinguished
practitioners. Nevertheless, there are many
analysts still with us whose words need to
be preserved.
This little book represents the beginning to
that task of preservation. Although the Army
may not be able to continue the oral history pro-
ject, it has set inmotion a process that I fervently
hope will be continued by others. The Military
Operations Research Society, for which I am
the Army Sponsor, is an admirable choice to
pick up the torch. With Gene Visco now retired
but still activewith the Society, thatmay come to
pass. If so, I am sure the oral history will benefit
by expansion to include analysts from the other
services. I note that two of the analysts whose
history is included in this volume got their start
with the Army Air Forces (now the US Air
Force) during World War II.
I commend these pages to the younger and
even the middle-aged analysts now practicing.
There are important lessons to be learned about
searching for operational data, understanding
the operations being analyzed, and presenting
results to decision makers. I recall the advice
given by P. M. S. Blackett, one of the principals
in the founding of operational research in the
United Kingdom during World War II: ‘‘I think
the essential prerequisite of sound military ad-
vice is that the giver must convince himself that
if he were responsible for action he would
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himself act so.’’ Goodwords for analysts to keep
in mind.
Read and enjoy!
Walter W. Hollis, Deputy Under Secretary of
the Army (OR), The Pentagon
April 1997
OPERATIONS RESEARCH ORAL
HISTORY PROJECT INTERVIEW OF




U.S. Army Military History Institute
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Arthur ‘‘Art’’ Stein was the first Secre-
tary Treasurer of MORS in 1966. He then served
as Vice President of MORS and later as the third
MORS President, from 1967 to 1968. He was
elected a MORS Fellow of the Society (FS) in
1991. Mr. Stein earned a bachelor’s degree in
mathematics from City College of New York
(CCNY) in 1938. Art began his early career in
operations research at the Army Ballistics Re-
search Laboratory. He was named head of Op-
erations Research at the Cornell Aeronautical
Laboratory and remained in this position until
his retirement in 1974. After his retirement, Art
worked at Falcon Research and Development
Center until December 1983. After a second re-
tirement, he became a consultant at the Institute
for Defense Analyses (IDA). Mr. Stein passed
away on June 24, 1995. The interview was con-
ducted at IDA, Alexandria, Virginia, on April 2,
1992 and at Mr. Stein’s home in Williamsville
(near Buffalo), New York, on June 5, 1992.
Gene Visco:Would you begin by giving your
name, position, and address?
Art Stein:My full name is Arthur Stein—no
middle initial. I am presently a consultant here
at IDA and have been since 1984. I retired twice.
After about 15 years’ service, I retired at the be-
ginning of 1974 from the Cornell Aeronautical
Laboratory, which had been sold and named
CALSPAN Corporation. I then opened a branch
of the Falcon Research and Development Com-
pany, whose headquarters was in Denver. Falcon
was wholly owned by the Whittaker Corpora-
tion, a conglomerate. I retired from Falcon in De-
cember 1983. I turned it over to one of the other
fellows in the group. That company is now an
independent company; they bought themselves
out. They are now called ANSIM (Analysis
and Simulation) Corporation. Until two years
ago I maintained a separate office in the Buffalo,
New York, area. Now I have my office in my
home in Williamsville, New York.
Gene Visco: I’d like to ask you some basic
questions about your background as it might
pertain to operations research. Did you have
any military, family, or educational background
that was relevant?
Art Stein: With respect to military experi-
ence, the highest rank I held was staff sergeant.
My Army specialty was mathematician. How-
ever, I had two main activities during the time
I was in the Army. One, I served at the Ballistics
Research Laboratory (BRL), at Aberdeen Prov-
ing Ground, Maryland. I came back to that lab-
oratory as a private, after having been a civilian
there for three years. Also, half of my time in
service was on a ballistics team. This team,
which was a 12-man squad, had the responsibil-
ity for calibrating artillery weapons in the field.
So, I did that. About two or three months before
I was discharged and left service, a new project
had started. I’ll tell you something about that
later. As a result of that new project, I was asked
if I would assist. They needed a statistician—
somebody to do some test planning. It sounded
quite interesting. That’s how I got into the air-
craft vulnerability business, because the project
was associatedwith obtaining information from
war-weary aircraft. That was very shortly after
World War II was over. My Army service was
from July 14—Bastille Day—1944 through June
1946. My childhood and education: I was born
August 5, 1918, in New York City, where I was
raised and educated. I received my bachelor’s
degree from City College of New York (CCNY)
in 1938, with a major in mathematics. This may
be of interest to people in operations research:
At that time the possible fields for people in
mathematics were very restricted compared
to today. All we knew—and perhaps we were
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a bit provincial—was that you could teach it or
you could become an actuary. There were ap-
plied areas, such as astronomy and engineer-
ing. However, they would require that I go out
of town to some university and that was out of
the question in my particular circumstances. It
was my intention to become an actuary eventu-
ally. It was very difficult and time consuming
to go through that actuary sequence, because
first you had to be working in an insurance com-
pany and then take seven sequential examina-
tions, normally spaced over almost 10 years.
There was a depression on then, and openings
in insurance companies weren’t there. I tried.
As a backup, I took some undergraduate edu-
cation courses, as well, and then did some prac-
tice teaching in mathematics at a now-defunct
and very unusual high school in New York—
TownsendHarris High School. This was a school
for bright young boys. Upon successful comple-
tion of Townsend Harris, which they could do in
three years, they could enter CCNYwithout hav-
ing to take any examinations or have any partic-
ular grade level. Others going into CCNY had to
have a very high average—93 or 94—to get into
the college. I entered CCNY based on my grade
average. Incidentally I graduated from CCNY
at age 20, which wasn’t unusual in those days.
In fact, I would venture to say that, in that partic-
ular college, almost half of the students graduat-
ing were probably on the order of 20 years old.
After that, I went to Columbia University. When
I graduated from CCNY, there were no positions
available because of the Depression. I had taken
a number of civil service examinations and was
waiting to hear from them. One was for meteo-
rologist. I studied and learned something about
meteorology. I took some local civil service exam-
inations for clerical positions. Lo and behold,
one came along. In September 1939, I went to
Columbia University to major in mathematical
statistics, which was in the School of Econom-
ics. What turned me toward that particular area
was a conversation with a second cousin. Fami-
lies were very close-knit in those days. This sec-
ond cousin was really the fair-haired boy in the
extended family. He was going into medical re-
search and had studied two years of mathemati-
cal statistics to equip himself to do that kind of
work. When he heard about me, he asked to
see me and talked about the opportunities that
would exist in mathematical statistics. So that
opened up some new possibilities, and I thought
that made good sense. I knew I wasn’t interested
in theoretical mathematics, per se. I was inter-
ested already inproblem solving, andmathemat-
ical statistics seemed to be a way to do that.
I went to Columbia, which he had suggested
and which was fortunate because it was in
New York. I could continue working in the cler-
ical positionwith theNewYorkCityDepartment
of Welfare, which was the largest department in
the city in those days. Professor Harold Hotel-
ling, who was one of the best-known academics
in mathematical statistics, was at Columbia.
(We may come back to him later in connection
with some papers for the National Defense Re-
search Council, which he was involved with.)
I was fortunate, as well, in that all of the courses
offered in mathematical statistics could be taken
starting at 5:10 p.m. That is, half the courses
would be during the day and half would be dur-
ing the evening. The next year they inverted the
two. So it was possible in two years to get your
master’s degree. That was what I did. Columbia
did that to accommodate peoplewhowerework-
ing.Many of the people inmy classeswerework-
ing in various insurance companies. It was
interesting. In fact, some were actuaries. During
that period, the thing that influencedmemost to-
ward what we now know as operations research
was a course I took just to fill out the required
number of credits. I had taken all the courses
they had in mathematical statistics. This other
course was given in the School of Business. It
was called internal statistics; it related to statis-
tics of the firm or company. The first week con-
sisted of the very simple statistics that you
might see in business statistics. After that, it
turned out that what this man was presenting
was solving various problems—scheduling,
queuing, and optimization—and much of this
was analytical or trial-and-error, because we
had no computers and no theory to fall back on.
It was trying to think through the process—
how you would arrive at the best way to pro-
ceed. That I found to be one of the most inter-
esting courses I had taken. The course was
given by Dr. R. Parker Eastwood.
Shortly after I had started at Columbia, only
about three or four weeks into Hotelling’s
course, he introduced a little man who came
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down from the back of the room. Hotelling said
he was going to India to teach for a year. The
course would be taken over by this little man,
Dr. Abraham Wald, who was a Hungarian refu-
gee. Wald eventually became the leading mathe-
matical statistician in this country. Unfortunately
he had an untimely accidental death in an air-
craft accident in India. I guess he was in his 40s
when that happened. He was responsible for
the development of sequential analysis. It’s inter-
esting that when he first started to lecture, we
were so disappointed because we couldn’t un-
derstand his English. But he did much writing
on the blackboard. After the third lecture we
didn’t care particularly if Hotelling didn’t return.
Hotellingwas a very nice guy but rambled.Wald
presented everything in so logical a fashion and
made the difficult seem simple that it was really
inspiring. He was very, very modest—an unas-
suming person and the kind of professor people
really grew to love. Hewasmy professor for per-
haps half of the course work I had at Columbia.
Gene Visco:When and howdid you first start
doing work that became associated with opera-
tions research?
Art Stein: As I was nearing the end of the
two-year period at Columbia, I could not get
mymaster’s degree because therewas a required
seminar that was not given in the evenings. It
was the one exception to the ease of scheduling
all those courses. It was early 1941. Things were
beginning to heat up. The war in Europe had al-
ready started and things were already starting in
this country in terms of supplying the allied
forces. Hotelling suggested that the only man
he knew who was really doing any work in ap-
plied mathematical statistics was Captain Leslie
E. Simon. Hotelling thought maybe hewas ama-
jor by then. Also, applied work was being done
by people at the Bell Telephone Company. They
were working principally in probability, and
Walter Shewhart had just started some of his
work in quality control. Anyway, Hotelling
thought I should write to Simon at the Aberdeen
Proving Ground. So I wrote to Major Simon. It
turned out Major Simon was Colonel Simon by
then, and he had just become the director of the
BRL. He was a very remarkable man. He had
written a book,An Engineer’s Manual of Statistical
Methods, which was a very forward-looking, in-
teresting book on sampling and quality control,
while he was a lieutenant at Picatinny Arsenal,
New Jersey. Incidentally, I have a copy of that
at home, along with some other things, such as
the comments of a team thatwent to Europe after
the end of the war.
Gene Visco: Was that connected with Alsos?
That team was not associated with the Alsos
Project, which was strictly nuclear and was led
by a Dutch physicist who could not be cleared
for theManhattan Project. He had a team of mil-
itary police, whose mission was to capture the
French and German physicists they could find.
That way, if there was a German nuclear wea-
pons program, it would be stopped, so that there
couldn’t be a surge at the end. Those guys were
all incarcerated in a nice facility in England.
There’s some interesting stuff connected with
their reaction to the bomb—a separate part of
history.
Art Stein: There was another group, known
as the Lehigh Project, that was concerned with
assessing bomb damage. It eventually became
known as the Strategic Bombing Survey. Well,
I went to work at BRL on October 2, 1941. I
was assigned to a group called the Mathematics
Unit.
Gene Visco: What were some of your early
projects or tasks? What do you consider your
most interesting or important early work?
Art Stein: The principal work of the Math-
ematics Unit was the generation of bombing
trajectories to make bombing tables. At that
time the bomb trajectories, where you had
large curvatures, were done by finite-difference
methods—quadratures or numerical integration.
The study of finite differences had been re-
stricted to actuaries and astronomers. There
was no such course when I went to school.
The only places they taught that, I believe, were
at the University of Michigan and the Univer-
sity of California. The need for me, then, was
to study. The only really good book was by a
Frenchman, Jordan, which had been translated
into English.
Gene Visco: I took that course in 1949 at
Boston University, and there was no textbook
then.
Art Stein: At any rate, about half of what
they did in that unit was the start of these trajec-
tories. That’s where they were the most difficult
to apply. Once you got through the first 15 or so
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lines—we’d have a little template, marked qua-
drille pads, andMarchant orMonroe calculators—
and you’d start this trajectory for a particular
bomb and particular altitude and speed. These
were for standard conditions. At that time, if
you had nonstandard conditions, you applied
corrections using Galois equations to get the
differential effects for winds, errors in altitude,
tipping, air density variations, and yawing on
release. That also turned out to be half of what
I did. Most of the people there worked full time
on starting these trajectories.
Gene Visco:What do you consider your most
important or interesting work in these early
years?
Art Stein: I got into somewhat more interest-
ing work because I was new and did not have
the knowledge of all the various bombs and their
numbers that others did from having worked on
all these trajectories. About two weeks after I ar-
rived, the man who was in charge of this unit
gave an examination to the people who’d been
coming on board. In the examination he asked
very specific questions: For a specific bomb,
whose nomenclature was Mark or M so-and-so,
dropped from an aircraft travelling at a specified
velocity at a specified height, the trail of the
bomb would be such-and-such. Or he would
ask what the range would be. I didn’t know
one bomb from any other bomb, so all I did
was calculate what the vacuum trajectory would
be. Because the answers were multiple choice,
I always took a little bit less. I apparently got a
good grade on his examination. As a result I
was given some very interesting assignments.
Some of these assignments, other than what
turned out to be quite boring in starting these
various trajectories, were very interesting and
might have been called operations research, if
that discipline existed. For example, an ord-
nance officer at the Ordnance School, a lieuten-
ant, had devised a method of firing a rapid-fire
40millimeter gunwherein the tubewouldmove
in a circle. He had a cam set for this so that he
could change the diameter of that circle that
the muzzle would be moving in. The purpose
was to induce dispersion. What caused his be-
coming interested in this particular device was
that, at that time, there was a great fear of an in-
vasion by Germany. The war had started. It was
thought that there would be some sort of very
fast landing craft, doing a lot of maneuvering
on the way in. If you tried to track them with
the linear tracking systems we had, you would
have very large dispersions. If you had very
high precision, you would precisely miss, as it
were. So he thought of this as a way to induce
dispersion. The question was what is the proba-
bility that you’ll hit one of these things? And
how should you design the diameter as a func-
tion of range and some subjective estimate of
how much maneuvering was going on? I was
handed the problem of determining the proba-
bility of hitting with this device. From then on,
I got various coverage-type problems related
to bombing accuracy and effects, how many
you wanted in a stick of bombs, how to straddle
targets, and varieties of problems of that type.
They were assigned to this Mathematics Unit
at BRL. I even got to get my hands on things.
We designed, and had the machine shop at
BRLmake, a copper plate with all kinds of mov-
ing arms for doing vector additions to put in the
effects of winds aloft that a bomb would have.
That would get corrections to determine the
true ballistic wind. We made that gadget. They
had a problem calibrating the timing device to
determine the time of flight of the bomb. They
did bomb testing to get the ballistic coefficients
of various types of bombs. They would drop
a bomb and obtain a signal of when the bomb
left. Then they would take pictures of where
the splash area would be. These pictures were
taken with a Western Electric camera clock that
was originally developed for horse races. It had
one lens on a rapidly-moving dial and the other
saw the scene. The clock started when the bomb
was released, and the picture told you when the
bomb landed. Meantime you had telemetry that
had altitude readings and so on. That clock,
which was good to a thousandth of a second,
was much more precise than the chronograph
that had been used, which was good to a hun-
dredth of a second. But every once in a while
it would be off by a second or two. So I was told,
‘‘Fix it.’’ I couldn’t see, with the gears meshing
the way they were in that clock, why such an er-
ror would occur. However, just to see whether it
would help, I remember putting in an electric
bulb to dry out the entire mechanism. We said,
a couple hours beforewewere ready to go, we’ll
turn on the bulb. We did that and it took care of
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the problems. But I still don’t really understand
why. I’m merely saying we were given a variety
of tasks at that time; theywent from analytical to
hands-on work, such as with the ballistic winds
calculator and doing something about camera
clocks.
Now something else happened in the first
week that I was at BRL that would be of great in-
terest, from the point of view of operations re-
search. All that existed in the way of electronic
machines were accounting machines. IBM had
accounting machines that were over in head-
quarters. They were used for payroll and such.
However, at BRL the man who was in charge
of that unit thought that it should be possible
to adapt these accountingmachines to deal with
these finite differences and to do that job. They
were merely a series of additions—actually, tak-
ing differences, then taking them in another col-
umn, and more. So he went and talked with the
man who ran the accounting machines. This
man was Mr. Gillespie. I’m not sure whether
he ever finished high school. He was almost
a caricature of the Tennessee mountain man—
tall, lanky, chewing tobacco—but he had an in-
sight into the operation of that machine that
was really fantastic. They had written to IBM,
when BRL wanted to know whether it could
be used for this purpose of doing quadratures.
IBM said, no—that was impossible with those
machines. Mr. Gillespie wired up a machine.
He took the board apart, despite instructions
not to do this and that. Sure enough, he was do-
ing it. The BRL unit had a lady over there who
was doing the roughing of the cards and actu-
ally going through the operation. It was now
an ongoing operation, using the accounting
machines, to do some of the calculations. This
lady got sick; and, during my first week there,
I was sent to continue the work. Gillespie
showed me what to do. About the third day I
was there, a delegation came from IBM to see
how this thing was happening, despite the fact
that their people told them it couldn’t. Themen
from IBMwere all obviously VIPs (very impor-
tant persons), because they all had striped
pants and homburgs [Editor’s note: a homburg
is a formal felt hat]. There was a large number—
must have been about a dozen of them. They all
stood around while this man from Tennessee
showed them how to wire the machine to get
these differences. At any rate, to my knowledge,
outside of the normal calculating machines like
the Marchants and Monroes that were in use,
that was the first time that the machines were
used. That preceded the high-speed computers
at Aberdeen by several years. Before that, all
of the calculations had been done manually in
a room filled with girls working with large qua-
drille pads—ruled paper. They still had to, be-
cause the machine wasn’t that fast. They had
these quadrille pads and had three shifts going.
The night shift, because there was no air con-
ditioning, had the windows open. Tiny gnats
would come in through the screens, fall on the
quadrille pads, and look like decimal points.
So, if any of the bombs went astray, blame it
on the gnats! After I was there about a year,
it turned out there was another problem. One
group had been doing surveillance testing of
ammunition to see how the ammunition would
stand up in storage and whether it was still
good to use. At the initiative of Colonel Simon,
that group teamed with a group from Bell Tele-
phone Laboratory. The Bell people included
Harold Dodge and other people who had been
working in the area of quality control. Walter
Shewhart was the chief of the group. The mis-
sion was to generate sampling inspection tables
for the very large increase in acquisition, pro-
curement of munitions, and other things. There
were no formal procedures for our inspectors,
who were now going out to all the plants. To-
ward the end of 1942, I transferred into that
group. For the next two or three years I was in-
volved in developing these tables. As a result,
when they had that seminar at Columbia Uni-
versity and I could finally attend, my master’s
thesis was on most-powerful double sampling
inspection plans, because you could take differ-
ent ratios in the two samples. We wanted to get
the best sampling plans to put into those tables.
During that same time,Wald had started sequen-
tial analysis, which gave themost-powerful mul-
tiple sampling plans. Initially, you just took one
sample, tested it, and then saw whether your
moving mean went above or below these lines
to accept or reject the lot of ammunition or what-
ever youwere sampling. I used that before it was
really available and published. Because I was
talking to them, I got some of their initial notes
and used it, since it was the optimum. It was
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impractical, though, to take one at a time and go
back for another.Wewereworking in batches. So
we were using group sequential plans. Later
Wald actually wrote about group sequential
sampling as part of the book on sequential anal-
ysis. Incidentally,Walter Shewhartwas the father
of statistical quality control. He was still at Bell
Telephone. They had developed double sam-
pling inspection plans. Because theywere within
the same company, one section would do a de-
tailed inspection of a rejected lot. Their outgoing
qualities were very different from the govern-
ment inspection, because they were involved in
this sort of screening operation.With the govern-
ment inspection, if it was unacceptable, it would
go back to the manufacturer, who had to fix it,
change the process or something, and resubmit.
So both the average outgoing quality of those
procedures and the average amount of inspec-
tion were different. The latter type was more
typical of the type of procurement the govern-
ment would be doing. That became the basis
for the Ordnance Sampling Inspection Tables.
Later, with slight modifications, they became
MIL-STD-105, which is still used all over the
world for attribute-type sampling. In addition
to the work on this type of sampling, because
this surveillance group had the statisticians
within BRL, it also received other tasks during
the war. For example, I became the fellow who
had to answer queries from the artillery. The
question would come in: Why don’t we get
the same results you see in the firing tables?
There would be some kind of mismatch. They
would describe what they were doing and
thought they should get a result they weren’t
getting. I would have to prepare the responses
to that and give it to Dr. Theodore B. Sterne,
head of the Terminal Ballistics Laboratory, or
to Colonel Simon to send out. Usually thosewere
all quick responses. They needed it within a day
or two. From the South Pacific the type of ques-
tion was often something like, how many shots
should we expect to have to fire to breach a cave
or bunker on the islands, realizing that we have
to get succeeding shots into the same hole? No
one impact would be sufficient to cause the
breach. That would have been a simple problem
if each one were independent. Unfortunately,
theyweren’t. It appeared to us to be amuchmore
complicated problem. All during that time at
BRL, in the early days of the war, there existed
a very unusual, multidisciplinary growth in the
attack on problems—very different from what
was usual before. Simon had induced the emi-
nent mathematician, Dr. Oswald Veblen, as his
‘‘recruiter’’—one of two well-known brothers.
Veblen, as the recruiter, obtained almost the en-
tire University of Californiamath faculty to come
to work at BRL. Edward McShane, who was the
head of the math department at Virginia, was
a famous man in integration theory. He had
[Edwin Powell] Hubble, the astronomer, on the
Scientific Advisory Committee. Part time, he
had [John] von Neumann, who was there two
days a week. [Isador Isaac] Rabi, the physicist;
[George] Kistiakowski; Dr. [Bernard] Lewis from
the Bureau of Mines. It was quite an assemblage.
Many of these people did what I would today
call operations research, but it wasn’t called that
then, at all. They all had problems within their
spheres that were types of optimization prob-
lems, although they were dealing with very
hot, current problems. For example, in about
two hours, von Neumann was given and solved
the problemof how to correct for spin of a shaped
charge:Whatwas the optimum configuration for
a liner to compensate for spin? The cross section
was the spiral of Archimedes. It would compen-
sate, because a spinning projectile normally
doesn’t give you the same kind of penetration
that a nonspinning projectile would with a
shaped charge. The jet is moving around in
a spinning projectile, instead of staying in one
place. It was fantastic to see these minds at
work. During that same time he was verymuch
involved with the concepts for the original
computer—the ENIAC. I didn’t know it then
that he was spending the rest of his time on de-
veloping the atomic bomb. Many of these men
who came and went were contributing in dif-
ferent ways. At BRL there were problems in op-
timizing fragmentation of projectiles: What
kind of fragments should you have? What sizes?
What kinds of errors could you stand on time
fuzes? I worked on the variations you would
get from a powder-train time fuze: What were
they due to, and how could you get rid of them?
That was very interesting. There was a lot of that
type of work. BRL then was very small. In fact
my badge number, when I got there, was 78.
Many of the peoplewith lower numbers had left.
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So, initially, it was quite small and started in one
of the wings of the administration building.
It was called the Ballistics Section. All that
growth took place in the early years of the war.
They got an air-conditioned addition to the
building by claiming that the Bush differential
analyzer required conditioned air. They were
able to get the whole addition that they built
air-conditioned. I should correct something I
said earlier. I said the only machines being
used were the calculators—the Marchants and
Monroes. For artillery projectiles, where you
had these simple and relatively flat types of tra-
jectories, they could make use of Sciacchi equa-
tions. You didn’t have to use the numerical
methods that were used for the bomb trajecto-
ries. They made use of the Bush differential an-
alyzer, which was a nonelectronic machine. It
would occupy an area about 40 feet by 70 or
80 feet. It was about waist high, with long rods
and gears at various stations. People would
stand at these stations. As the calculations were
going on, somebody would read off a time of
flight; somebody else was getting the range.
They would take it off at various times, then
they would match up these different readings
and do interpolations to get them all for the
same times. That was used for artillery, flatter-
trajectory firing. The name came from Vannevar
Bush, who had one of these at Harvard. This was
the second one.
One of the reasons Imention the activities of
the academics at BRL was that their general
behavior was very focused on the solving of
applied problems. Many of these involved op-
timization of procedures. To my knowledge,
there had been no work on the kinds of opera-
tions research that dealt with large forces. With
[Dr. Oskar] Morgenstern, von Neumann had
published a book on the theory of games and
economic behavior. We very much wanted to
talk to him about things that he had in the book,
because the book was not applied to military-
type problems.Wewanted to see howwe could
adapt his game theory to military problems.
But it was difficult at work to get him to do that.
Von Neumann was the type of fellow who
never wanted to talk about what he had done.
He felt somebody else could come along and sort
of mop up. He was always interested in talking
about something new. However, we attended
the meetings of the Scientific Advisory Commit-
tee, which met in the evening. Preceding dinner
there would be a cocktail party, and he loved
Manhattans. So those of us who were interested
in the theory of games would gather around
him. One fellow would come back with two
Manhattans. He’d take one and give one to
von Neumann: ‘‘Dr. von Neumann, a toast!’’
Von Neumann would enjoy a Manhattan. Then
another. I must admit we did this with malice
aforethought. Soonhewould talk about his book.
Thosewere the only timeswe could really get his
attention to those types of problems. Incidentally,
this was the BRL Scientific Advisory Committee.
It had a number of Nobel Prizewinners on it and
was very powerful.
Gene Visco: Do you know how and where
Colonel Simon got his training?
Art Stein: I don’t know where he got his
training afterWest Point. It would be interesting
to see. One man who might know is Dr. Frank
Grubbs, whom I was going to suggest you con-
tact. He’s one of the very few people I know
who’s still technically active and who was
around during that period. Hewas an officer—a
captain, then a major for most of the time I was
there. Dr. Grubbs is a mathematical statistician
who authored many BRL reports and later the
Army Engineering manual on systems analysis.
I think he still lives in the vicinity of BRL. An-
other man now works on the West Coast; his
name is Dr. Alexander Charters. He was in-
volved with the spark photography range for
getting drag coefficients and behavior of projec-
tiles, and with many of the scaling studies that
were done. Dr. von Neumann would consult
also for some of that work. My wife actually
was one of the computers. In those days people
were called computers.Mywife had been a jour-
nalismmajor andweweremarried in December
after I started to work at Aberdeen. She came
down to Aberdeen and after three months or
so she was stir crazy and wanted to get a job.
She thought she could work on the post paper.
She went into the civilian personnel office there.
They said, ‘‘You’re a college graduate? Did you
have college math?’’ She said, ‘‘All I had was
this one required course.’’ He said, ‘‘But it was
called College Math?’’ She said, ‘‘Yes.’’ ‘‘Well,
then, you should go to BRL.’’ So he sent her to
BRL. Dr. Louis S. Dederick, the associate director,
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said, ‘‘You know, you really haven’t had much
mathematics, have you?’’ She said, ‘‘Well, that’s
what I tried to tell them. But they said I should
come here because I had this course called
College Math.’’ Dr. Dederick looked at her
and her paperwork. Then he said, ‘‘Stein? Are
you related to Arthur Stein?’’ She said, ‘‘Yes,
he’s my husband.’’ ‘‘Oh, that’s all right, then.
He can help you at night!’’ So that’s how my
wife became a computer. She first worked on
the second parts of those bombing tables. There
were a very large number of people, all called
computers, doing the rest of the bombing ta-
bles. They were actually putting them together.
Later she was loaned out to assist various other
people. When von Neumann came, he used to
ask for her to help him. She would tell me what
a real gentleman he was.
Gene Visco:Would Chester Clark be the per-
sonwhose name you couldn’t recall before? You
had given me some names earlier.
Art Stein: No, but Chester Clark would be
another person who would be good to speak
with. He was the executive officer. I think he’s
still alive. Mr. Robert (Bob) Kent was an associ-
ate director of BRL and head of the Exterior Bal-
listics Laboratory. He served as the technical
director. Kent worked in many of the exterior
ballistics and artillery fragmentation problems,
among others. He was a brilliant man. Floyd
Hill came there around the end of the war, in
early 1946. He could tell you some of the stuff
from a different viewpoint. Floyd preceded
DaveHardison, looking at tank problems. Floyd
was in the Proving Ground Detachment with
me.When he got into it, I’m not sure.He’s a very
close friend, lives in this area, and is currently
a consultant at IDA. Walter Hollis, FS, knows
him because Floyd used to be at the Army’s
OTEA [Operational Test andEvaluationAgency].
At any rate, one of the reasons I’ve spouted per-
haps too long about thesemen, rather thanwhat
they may have done specifically in operations
research, is that I think it would be very desir-
able and useful for these archives to obtain at
least two different kinds of things. One, the bib-
liography of BRL reports. That would trigger
the memories of the people with whom you’d
speak, including myself, on some of the activi-
ties and those activities that might be consid-
ered pre-OR. Two, the correspondence files on
the different projects. There were many letters
and reports that came in from the field. There
had to be responses to these. In those days, un-
like the Navy, I don’t know of any people who
were with the troops doing operations research
orwhowere stationed at various commands do-
ing that. At least I don’t know of that being done
in the Army. The Navy did, and the Army Air
Force had something going on in England. We
would later receive large three-view drawings
of a B-17 (Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress) with
holes marked, where they came back with frag-
ment holes. From that we would try indirectly
to deduce that those areas where there were
no holes were more vulnerable, so those planes
didn’t come back. So, in addition to seeing what
the distribution might be over an aircraft, we
tried this type of indirect estimation of vulnera-
bilities of aircraft, by looking at the damage to
the returned planes. I didn’t have any opportu-
nity after the war to verify the basic premise.
I never thought of myself as doing operations
research then or of how broad the term would
become. I remember when the journal (Journal
of the Operations Research Society of America
[JORSA]) first came out. The early practitioners
seemed mostly to be mathematical statisticians
and a few physical scientists. Some of the early
papers had to do with discrete distributions
and Poissons and binomials, and various types
of applications of this sort. The early journal
had a much narrower focus than was true later.
I would guess it was about 1946 before the
phrase, operations research, first came to my
attention. It was used earlier. There was a ques-
tion, are you doing operations analysis or oper-
ations research? That was kicked around. When
I get into the last part, that deals with the whole
question of aircraft vulnerability, optimization
of when you should open or close fire, air-to-
air duels and the things that I was talking to
Shephard [Professor Ronnie Shephard] about
having gone on in England. I don’t want to get
into that because it’ll take a little longer. In these
other areas, until I got into that aircraft vulnera-
bility bit, I personally was involved primarily
with ballistics, and sampling inspection and
quality control. By virtue of some of the earlier
work, I was also asked to look into malfunc-
tions because they were involved with tests
and sampling. Something would malfunction
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and I would have to go see why it was happen-
ing. What kind of a test could we run to find
out? I became familiar, particularly with fuzes;
they were the most amenable to malfunction or
at least to give results that were somewhat un-
expected at times. Later we were visited, once
a year, by classes fromWest Point. There would
be a series of lectures on different subjects,
and I was asked to talk about ammunition
malfunctions—what kinds of things could or
might happen. That was a kind of test-design
work.We set up experiments and tests to deter-
mine what the causes would be. I think you
would still call that statistics, rather than oper-
ations research, but I don’t know. It is very im-
portant that we obtain the reports of Herbert
K. Weiss, who came to BRL toward the end of
the war—about 1945 or 1946. I would say he
was the principal man doing operations research
at BRL. I believe he left BRL about 1953 or 1954 to
go to Northrop. The last I knew he lived in Palos
Verdes, south of Los Angeles. Prior to coming to
BRLheworked at theArmy’sAirDefense School
at Fort Bliss, Texas. He has an antiaircraft gun
sight, the Weiss Sight, named after him. I knew
him to be brilliant, imaginative, and a prolific
writer on many diverse military OR topics.
Dr. Paul Deitz, head of the Vulnerability Labo-
ratory at BRL, has promised to sendme a listing
of Weiss’s BRL reports. If he is still alive, he
would be an excellent man to interview. Floyd
Hill may have his address and phone numbers.
Jim Williams: Art, what is your perspective
in this oral history?
Art Stein:What I have been describing is ei-
ther work that I did or was involvedwith, or my
perceptions of work being done and in which I
had some interest and awareness. However,
back then there were Black Programs, just as
there are today, and I was quite junior in the or-
ganization. As a result, there’s much I didn’t
know about. In addition, there were some sec-
tions that I just never interactedwith, such as In-
terior Ballistics. We didn’t do very much with
them during the time I was there. I had much
more to do with that area later on. On the other
hand, I think that there is very little of what we
might term operations research or operations re-
search-related activities going on in a section or
branch such as Interior Ballistics. They started
out as sections and later as the staff grew at
BRL, they were made branches and later in fact
were called laboratories all on their own. Well,
what I have related so far essentially concerned
the work in ballistics, per se. I was originally
with a mathematics unit and some of the prob-
lems I described were during that first year at
BRL when I was with that unit. Then I trans-
ferred into the surveillance unit, which was
much more statistical in nature and that’s where
a good deal of the sampling inspection, quality
assurance, and ammunition malfunction work
was done.
I went into the Army in 1944 from that sec-
tion and returned as a private. I believe I have
described some of that. Initially when I returned
it was back to the same desk. I think Imentioned
that and I had a number of WACs (Women’s
Army Corps) and even a couple of lieutenants
who worked for me during the day; but before
we started work and after we finished, then
we reversed roles.
The next thing I did was go to a ballistics
team known as the T-6 Chronograph teams.
They were developed in 12-man squads to cali-
brate artillery weapons in the field. We used
Doppler radar, but the entire operation wasn’t
that well mechanized. It was necessary to have
a mathematician on the team, because the radar
was not located right behind the gun itself or
close to it, but was offset. Therefore, you had
to make corrections for the amount of offset
when you were determining muzzle velocity.
You couldn’t take chronograph screens as
you would use at a Proving Ground where you
fire through an initial screen and then a later
screen in order to get velocity and then work
back to the muzzle. These were Doppler radars,
verymobile, and you could use them to calibrate
guns in actual combat.
We had three port calls to go to various the-
aters and each time they were canceled because
needs changed. The war was starting to wind
down. At the end there wasn’t very much for
this team to do. We had finished putting every-
thing back in Cosmoline [Editor’s note: Cosmoline
is a rust preventative] again and actually we were
trying to find useful things to do.
It was just at that time—in late 1945—that
a letter from the Office of the Chief of Ordnance
came to the Development and Proof Services
at the Proving Ground. It said there were 20 to
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30 obsolete aircraft there at the Proving Ground,
and it was desired to fire a very large number
of types of small arms and small caliber ma-
chine gun types of ammunition at them at dif-
ferent velocities and angles. The types would
include ball or shot, high explosive, high explo-
sive incendiary, armored piercing, armored
piercing incendiary. The purpose was to deter-
mine which caliber would be optimum for fir-
ing against the aircraft and to obtain some
notion of the effects.
It used to be that people would be mostly
concerned with the probability of hit and once
the projectile or a round hit whatever it was
designed to or supposed to hit, it was assumed
itwould do the job. Thiswas true earlierwith our
tank munitions and also with the anti-aircraft
munitions. But obviously this wasn’t true now.
This program was requested by the Chief of
Ordnance. Well, there was some concern. This
had not been done before. There was some con-
cern on the part of Colonel Carr at the Develop-
ment and Proof Services as to whether he could
actually accomplish all the different tasks and
angles and typeswith so few aircraft there. They
wanted to do tests with gasoline in tanks and in
a sense this was a forerunner of the current live
fire testing that was asked for by Congress for
new types of aircraft.
Actually it was Joe Sperrazza and another
chief Proof officer working for Colonel Carr at
that time in Development and Proof Services
who were going to conduct the testing. They
asked me if I would be able to help them by ex-
amining the statistical meaningfulness of doing
different shots under the various conditions.
They had to get a reply quickly. I really didn’t
have more than a day to look at that problem.
At that time, as Imay havementioned, I was
a staff sergeant. The problem was one that
required some assessment of the likelihood of
different types of results and an assumption re-
gardingwhatmight be a permissible error in the
answers. I did some calculations and made
some estimates of what kinds of variations there
might be among a group of projectile types. On
that basis it appeared to me that if we wanted to
get the answer to the questions raised by the
Chief of Ordnance within 10 percent, we would
need more than three or four thousand aircraft.
Assumptions would have to be made regarding
howmany shots wemight be able to take against
an airplane, even with fixing it up, before we
would no longer have it to use.
But if you wanted to get answers within 20
percent, you would need something like 1,200
airplanes. That’s what I told them. I never
expected that anything like that would happen,
but they asked me to look at that problem and
that’s what I did and those are the answers I got.
Well, I guess before Colonel Carr sent his
letter back to the Chief of Ordnance with those
numbers in it, he called around a couple of pla-
ces and saw nothing that suggested there was
anything wrong with what I had written. So he
sent it in.
At this point we switch to the Office of the
Chief of Ordnance and the letter is on the
Chief’s desk. He’s first seeing it. I knew some
of the people there. Later I got to know them
quite well, one woman real well. She was a very,
very fine analyst in her own right. MelvinMiller
was there and they all told me that when the
General saw this letter he just about hit the ceil-
ing [Laughter] and he put a call into the Proving
Ground toColonelCarr.Hewanteda conference
call and he wanted Colonel Simon from BRL,
who was a scientist in the Army Officer Corps
at that time, and the Director of the BRL to be
in on the call.
Colonel Simon came to Colonel Carr’s office
and there was a group of people in Colonel
Carr’s office when the call came in. I was sitting
there as well. The General asked Colonel Carr,
‘‘And who made the analysis? Who came up
with this number of 1,200 airplanes?’’ Colonel
Carr said, ‘‘Why Sergeant Stein, sir.’’ [Laughter]
Then he wanted to speak to Colonel Simon.
TheGeneral said, ‘‘Les, what do you think about
that estimate? Do you know who this Sergeant
Stein is?’’ And Colonel Simon—I loved him for-
ever afterward—said, ‘‘Sir, if Sergeant Stein says
you need 1,200 aircraft, that’s howmany aircraft
you need.’’ [Laughter]
Jim Williams:Do you remember the name of
the Chief of Ordnance at that time?
Art Stein: No, I probably could dig it up
somewhere. Believe it or not, they started ship-
ping in 1,200 airplanes. They all came flying into
Aberdeen Proving Ground and that was the
start of the largest systematic investigation of
aircraft vulnerability. The cost of the testing
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was provided by the air people, not by ord-
nance, because they wanted to know how to
make aircraft less vulnerable. The ordnance
people wanted to know how to make better mu-
nitions for shooting against aircraft. So there
were those two interests.
I believe the amount of money provided by
the Air Force was on the order of two million
dollars a year for that program. We had about
eight ranges going at the same time and we also
had quite a number of supplementary tests.
Let me say that very shortly after this pro-
gram started we scrapped that original plan of
testing all these many different types because
we knew that if we didn’t get a particular type
of damage with a larger and faster projectile,
we weren’t apt to get it with a slower one. We
started to do our test designs incorporating se-
quential types of subplans, you might say.
In addition, we felt that we could get a great
deal of information from the aircraft without
interacting with the loaded fuel tank. If we first
downloaded the fuel and did some structures
testing, we looked at component damage for
power plants, fuel, fuel tanks, probability of get-
ting fires, personnel, damage, casualties, and
structures.
When I left the Army I came back to BRL,
because I had been a civilian there to begin with.
And the program I was responsible for was the
aircraft vulnerability program.
Gene Visco: Did you mention the date when
you made that estimate?
Art Stein: The actual date?
Gene Visco: The approximate year.
Art Stein: 1945.
Now organizationally this program then
was transferred away from Development and
Proof Services to BRL. The responsibility was
put there and I was responsible for that pro-
gram. It was embedded within the Terminal
Ballistics Laboratory headed by Dr. Ted Stern.
Gene Visco: I had forgotten about Ted.
Art Stein: He passed away.
I was put together with a new employee at
BRL for whom I worked directly, namely Herb
Weiss. That’s when I first met him. Our original
staff consisted of the two of us, and a computer.
Gene Visco: This was a human computer?
Art Stein: A human computer person who
was Francis Hill—Frankie Hill—whowas Floyd
Hill’s wife. Floyd Hill was also an enlisted
man in the BRL Detachment. And a Lieutenant
Britton.
It wasn’t long before the requirements of the
staff grew so large so that we had tomake signif-
icant additions. Now the test planningwas done
by BRL. The test executionwas byDevelopment
and Proof Services. So therewould be a Proof of-
ficer. They would get the gun crews, the ammu-
nition together and the like. The test analysis
and test report were done at BRL.
Each time there was a test conducted by De-
velopment and Proof Services there would be
a firing record written by them that was in con-
sonancewith their procedures for all other types
of tests.
These firing records constituted the raw
data that we had to work with for vulnerability.
We were starting in this area with a blank piece
of paper. We appreciated that there would be
different types of damage, immediate kills some
would be interested in, attrition kills to enemy
aircraft, types of kills that would interfere with
missions but not necessarily be killed, types of
damage thatmight cause extensive requirements
for repair before the aircraft could be used again
although they weren’t actually killed, and the
like.
We had 5-minute kills to represent relatively
quick damage that might prevent a bomber from
releasing on target at the time it was intercepted.
Thesewere notionswehad for organizing the de-
scription of the damage. They were not entirely
independently generated by us. We, I think,
had a big part but there also had been otherwork
going on for other reasons at the New Mexico
School of Mining and Technology located at that
time in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
They were operating under a contract for
the Navy to examine the effectiveness of anti-
aircraft shells. I believe they were 5 inch 38s [Ed-
itor’s note: this was the Mark 12 5"/38 caliber gun]
with Variable Time (VT) fuzes. To do that they
would raise aircraft between two towers sus-
pended by cable, fire the rounds, have their air-
bursts, and quite precisely map the locations of
bursts around the airplane. That was their prime
purpose, to investigate the VT fuze functioning.
However, and quite incidentally, when the
shell detonated, as a secondary objective they
saw where the fragments went. They wanted
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to knowwhether you would get hits or not with
the various locations of bursts and at the differ-
ent remaining velocities that these projectiles
had at the time they burst.
They actually then recorded where on the
airplanes the fragments would hit and they
would divide the hits as to whether they were
very serious or critical types of hits or not so crit-
ical. In other words, they had already started to
think about some procedure for this.
We were quite interested in finding out
what they were doing and to borrow or use
whatever concepts they had that would apply
and be useful for us.
Before I continue with what the effect of our
visit there was, I should describe how we did
our assessments because we wanted our dam-
age assessors to go to the New Mexico Institute
and see how they were doing damage assess-
ment there and what could be borrowed.
We had Naval and Air Force officers
assigned to the Proving Ground who did the
damage assessments for us. They would see
the damage, which cables were cut, what hap-
pened to an engine and the like, and we would
have some assumptions regarding the scenario
for the combat aircraft. They would then make
their assessment as to what the damage signi-
fied and they would write it up. They also
traced the damage, and described what it was
that was cut. They traced the path and wrote
perhaps a half page on the average description
of what was observed.
They would then categorize the damages to
whether it was an immediate kill, a 5-minute
kill, attrition kill, requiring air type. However,
I appreciated the fact that damage to that air-
plane, in that scenario, either was a kill or it
was not. It wasn’t a probabilistic matter either
way.
Nevertheless, if I insisted that they tell me
whether it was a kill or not, yes or no, and they
had entertained some doubts as to whether it
was a kill, I might be forcing a very large error
to get into the assessment procedure.
I had a system set up whereby they would
use fractional numbers aswell, reflecting the de-
gree of confidence they had—how they leaned.
They didn’t have to say they were certain this
was a kill, which would be 100 percent, but they
could say 80 percent, which meant that they
were fairly sure it was a kill, but it might not
be. They weren’t certain, or 10 percent, for some
particular damage they observed.
The underlying assumption for these frac-
tional kills was that the expectation over many
such assessments would be the expected num-
ber of kills you would have had if indeed some
all-knowing person had put 1s and 0s. That’s
how that assessment procedure was established
throughout all of the firing tests against the air-
craft vulnerability program.
Jim Williams: You were talking about how it
was that you came to be able to get essentially
a pretty high confidence level in the reliability
of different types of test results without forcing
people into making the categorical distinctions
between kills and non-kills.
Art Stein: Yes. Now our principle interest
was in the damage itself, true enough. However,
wewereworkingwith an assessment planwhich
would require that we put all of our information
together and obtain a probability of kill on that
airplane — estimate of probability of kill based
on the empirical results and assessments.
To that endwe had to divide the types of fir-
ings we did into two types; one was the random
hits wherewe could do that collection—random
hits over the presented area of the components
that were being examined. But then we had se-
lected tests where we were attempting to deter-
mine the causes of damage and the means that
would enable us to generalize from the damage
we observed to other aircraft. That became
a very important issue later.
We had some problems obtaining random
hits on aircraft, for example, shortly after we
first started shooting against engines, which
might have a presented area of about six to eight
square feet. I observed that just before lunch or
quitting time the engine would be killed and I
felt this was happening more often than one
would expect just by random hits over the pre-
sented area of the engine.
I went down to observe the procedures that
the gunner was using and, as we had gone
through previously, he would correct the wind-
age and then he would do a number of shots to-
wards the 1,500 yard range orwhatever andquite
far in order for us to get the proper slow down.
But before lunch is when he recalibrated,
taking extra care, and used his Mann barrel
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(which is putting the barrel in a V-slot cradle
and is used for very accurate shooting as com-
pared with conventional combat). He was able
to place the round, for example, right into a
P-47 (Republic P-47 Thunderbolt) oil cooler.
The inlet of that would be something like a
6-inch diameter circle and he could do that
from considerable range. That would cause oil
starvation and freezing of the engine and we
knew that by then, but it always happened before
lunch or before quitting time.
We had to devise something to correct and
get around that problem. So we took essentially
diagrams of the presented area of the engine at
the angles that were being employed, the off an-
gles in the particular series of shots, and we di-
vided that presented area into boxes of areas
equivalent to that of this oil cooler, and we la-
beled each box A, B, C, D, and so on. Then from
a table of random numbers we got the order
with which wewere going to challenge the gun-
ner to shoot at this engine.
Now hemight shoot H first, then B, et cetera,
and he actually aimed and we weren’t depend-
ing on accidental dispersion now at these far
ranges. But he aimed to get the round into the
presented area as on the diagram he had, that
part of the engine and the order in which we
had picked from a table of random numbers
and that was the challenge. We complimented
himonhis ability to do that throughout the series
and we got over this problem of the biasing re-
sults before quitting and lunch.
Jim Williams: Did you ever find out what it
was that motivated the extra care at that partic-
ular point in time, right before lunch and quit-
ting time?
Art Stein:Oh, they didn’t want to drag over.
You couldn’t stop the task and let things hang.
Suppose he started a fire? People would have
to go down and they’d have to assess it and
put it out. I mean there’s a lot of work to be
done. So that nothing interfered with the order-
liness of life, if you went and finished it off and
killed it, that was it. You could make things a lot
neater.
There aremany small things of that kind that
arose and we were learning as we went along
how to properly conduct the tests.
The assessors, as I mentioned, were Naval
and Air Force officers, and I went with them
to Albuquerque to speak with the people there.
The people we met were extremely capable and
even though theywere concentrating on a some-
what different problem than the one we were
facing, they were very, very helpful and after
that we were able to continue to cooperate a
great deal. We had established a good relation-
ship with them. It was an experience for the as-
sessors and for me to see an experimental
program somewhat like ours that had been go-
ing on for a period of perhaps two to three years
and where some of the procedures hadmatured
and they had also observed some of the things
we had started to see.
For example, we also did tests not just firing
these rounds that the Office of the Chief of Ord-
nance had talked about, but we wanted to get
information that was important for air bursts,
anti-aircraft shells, and missile warheads.
To do this for our purposes we developed
a controlled fragmentation shell. We had nine
shells, three different initial velocities by con-
trolling the charge-to-metal ratios with these
experimental warheads, and three different frag-
ment sizes. These were obtained by notching the
warhead.
The men responsible for the design of these
controlled fragmentation shells to give us the
initial velocities and fragmentations that we
wanted were Mr. Shaw and Noah Tolch. They
were both very capable and fine people and
we worked quite well together with them.
They were able to obtain very good control.
The shell was made in the machine shop at BRL
and when we fired them, we fired them stati-
cally. They would sit in the cradle and we’d det-
onate them. They might either be horizontal
or vertical depending upon what we had in an
arena. We used an arena with several aircraft
with engines running. We had components out
on fuel tanks on stands. We had collected boxes
to show us where the fragments were that were
coming off from these warheads. Each warhead
detonation had done a tremendous amount of
damage.
One of the things that we observed was that
we hadmasses or fragment sizes up to the order
of something like three-eighths inch square—I
think 700 grains was the largest mass we had.
We had about 8,000 feet per second. That would
be a very large test of warheads.
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In thousands of such fragment impacts, we
never obtained a kill that was due to structural
damage alone. That was a rather robust finding
we felt. So that there’s no misunderstanding,
that did not include damage in control cables
or any portion of the control system, per se.
Jim Williams: You’re talking about the basic
airframe.
Art Stein: The basic airframe and skin.
There were many other interesting factors.
We found that you could put an average of 20
50-caliber projectiles into the R-2800 piston en-
gine, whichwas on the P-47, on the B-26 (Martin
B-26 Marauder) light bomber, and on the
Navy’s F-4, before you’d stop the input of the
engine. These were extremely robust and in fact
the chief way you obtained the kill at all was by
a shot into the oil cooler. To know what that
would signify, we ran off-line tests where we
shut off the oil to an engine and found that it
would run about 15 minutes before it froze.
We found in our firing tests that this kept hap-
pening with not that much dispersion around
the 15-minute freeze point.
We did the same side tests with hydraulics
and we got to understand that an in-line liquid-
cooled airplane like the P-51 (North American
Aviation P-51 Mustang) was extremely vulnera-
ble compared to the P-47. The P-51’s engine
was up there in the front where it had two circu-
latory systems. It had the oil and the hydraulics
and a hole in either one would cause a kill, an at-
trition kill on that airplane. And because the
engine is jacketed, you couldn’t miss them if
you hit that anywhere in the presented area
of the engine.
The P-51 may have been more maneuver-
able and had an advantage that way, but the
P-47 certainly was a lot more robust. It was the
most robust airplane I’ve seen. When you look
at the presented area and what you could hit
with just those two small circles for the oil cooler
underneath and the top of the pilot’s head if he
was coming ahead.
The early versions didn’t even have any fuel
in the wings. The fuel was behind the engine in
an L-shaped tank coming down and then below
the pilot. All in all it was a tough airplane, but
those were all findings that we would never
have expected. As far as hits with high explo-
sive shells were concerned, we did that. We
cut off sequentially different amounts of pro-
pellers to see when we would get sufficient im-
balance for there to be kills.
We detonated small blocks of explosives to
take out cylinders and in different sequences
on the engine to see what they would signify.
When you had a running engine and you put
a bullet into it, it seemed to be as though it were
alive. You’d hear the roar of the engine and then
it seemed to grind out any pebbling or damage
that the bullet may have caused. It would have
grounded that cylinder that might be ineffec-
tive, but it sounded as though the engine spit
the projectile back out again when you listened
to it.
We measured the ability and the power of
the engine by pulling a dynamometer that we
had in the airplanes. We did a great many inves-
tigations offline to obtain incendiary function-
ing distributions for probabilities of fire to see
what the delay timeswere for fuel spray to come
out from tanks after they were hit. We even did
some tests just before I left Aberdeen in the
stratosphere chamber just to see whether we
could get any ignition at extremely high alti-
tudes and we did, although the kind of fire we
obtained was very different from anything
I had seen. It was an orange transparent fire,
very thin, which made me think that we should
have been doing an altitude chamber examina-
tion to get a better feel for what could occur at
altitude.
Unfortunately, they still haven’t done that
today after all these years. All in all we were,
as I said, learning as we went along. The big
problem, of course, was we were going to know
a great deal about these obsolete aircraft from
World War II. How does that help us? That was
the subject of an inquiry. A small board was
set up by the Air Force to see whether the
$2 million per year they were spending at
Aberdeen was worthwhile. That question was
just one of the questions raised then. How does
this shooting against obsolete airplanes help
you for the future?
The members of the committee that came to
BRL were Colonel Charles Lindbergh, Jimmy
Doolittle, and a Navy officer whose name I can’t
remember.
Jim Williams: Was that committee given
a particular name?
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Art Stein: I don’t know. Lindbergh was the
most outspoken of the three. He asked very
sharp, good questions. We got to this principal
question of how can you estimate new airplanes
that we were shooting at.
This was essentially what we did and how I
described it to them. We didn’t look at aircraft
theway they did. To us, the aircraft was a conve-
nient collection of components. Some of the
components of the new aircraft will still exist, al-
though perhaps in different sizes, but physically
comparable to the components in these older
airplanes. Some of the skin or particular type
of aluminum may not be in the same place on
the new airplane, but how it affects the function-
ing of the ignition of the fuze and of the incendi-
ary, we learned from the older ones.
Aside from the assessment of the kill of
those older airplanes themselves, the descrip-
tions of the damage of what happened is what
was so important—what was going on physi-
cally. I looked at the airplane as having perhaps
50 red bricks and 200 brown bricks where the
bricks represented different componentry or
material and the numbers represent their rela-
tive size.
The new airplane doesn’t have 50 red
bricks, but it has 20 red bricks. It has 600 brown
bricks, but also has some purple bricks that the
old one didn’t have. Now we have to see what
fraction of the total presented area is repre-
sented by purple bricks and what difference
they would make. In other words, the physical
things that we don’t understand, that we
couldn’t predict, what difference would they
make in the overall assessment? If the difference
was not large, we would estimate it as best we
could from what we knew physically. But if it
could be significant and important and if we
were looking to say something about one of
our own airplane’s vulnerability, I would gener-
ally go visit the chief designer. Say on a new jet
engine, we didn’t have any modern jet engines
to shoot at. But we had these World War II air-
planes. We had some P-59s (Bell P-59 Airaco-
met, the first American jet fighter aircraft) with
centrifugal flow engines. But we had no actual
flow jet engines left to shoot at. I went to the
chief designer for these engines. Theywere very
cooperative and we’d have detailed drawings
of the engine and I would start in the front
and I’d ask, ‘‘Well, what if we had a pin hole
here? What would happen?’’
He would say ‘‘Oh, nothing.’’ I said, ‘‘Well,
suppose it were a half inch hole?’’ Well, he
didn’t know. I said, ‘‘Suppose it were a three
inch hole.’’ ‘‘Oh, it would be terrible.’’ I would
close in from the two ends to try to find where
the zone ofmixed responsemight be on his part.
Where was he certain and sure and where was
he not?
Then I would proceed backward through
the engine, station by station, looking for holes,
chips off of particular turbines, holes in the tail-
pipe, and obtain his best overview of what the
significance would be.
Now we knew from tests on the materials
how big the holes were that we had made, but
we didn’t know what the significance of mak-
ing them would be for the new components.
In some cases, we didn’t know what the holes
or damage would be if the material was quite
different. For example, we had metalite type
of control surfaces. Metalite was really a type
of plastic. We did these tests involving air-
craft that were sitting on the ground, but in ac-
tual fact they’d be in an air stream if they were
flying. One question was, ‘‘How much differ-
ence would that make?’’ We would cut notches
in ringmaterials and put them in awind tunnel
to see whether we would get any increase
in damage. We found that the raised petal ma-
terial would flutter and then break where it
was bent and wouldn’t cause any increase in
damage.
But we weren’t sure that would happen
in metalite, and indeed, metalite did rip and
it was much worse when you did that kind of
testing.
We had to rely on many supplementary
tests to obtain this information. It’s interesting
that today in terms of live-fire testing programs
that variousmodels have been set up for predic-
tions. The important thing with respect to the
modeling of the damage that we learned was
that we could not have a universal model which
would exist for all the new aircraft to come and
merely require that we modify geometry and
deal with the damage estimation that way. The
introduction of new materials, new control sys-
tems, much larger power plants all meant that
there had to be a continuing surveillance and
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vigilance that the models would be current for
the new types of aircraft emerging.
It was for that reason that we wanted to em-
phasize obtaining an understanding of the phe-
nomenology of damage. For example, given the
distribution of length and duration of incendi-
ary flash on hitting skin at different obliquities
and different thicknesses; then coupling that
with the delay times for fuel sprays to emerge
from a fuel tank that was hit either below the liq-
uid level in the tank or in some cases from above
and going through. We determined that where
we had an intersection of the flash and the
emerging spray we would have ignition and
fire, but where the distances might be large
and the flash located very close to the skin, it
might not be available any longer. It would have
gone out by the time the fuel spray reached it or
the fuel air mixture that is caused by the fuel
spray would reach it.
Those were principles that enabled us to go
to a different type of aircraft and take what dif-
ferences existed for it, but apply the principles
we had learned regarding ignition and be able
to estimate what we would expect to get on this
other airplane.
At all times we wanted to obtain the feeling
for the physical principles involved that we
could use in order to make those predictions.
We saw that it would be very dangerous just
to rely on the empirical data themselves.
Now a number of things would occur.
Sometimes we didn’t have all the aircraft on
hand when we wanted to do the firing and
we had some close calls as to being able to con-
tinue our efforts. We were engaged in these
R-2800 engine tests, and as I mentioned, they’re
on a number of different aircraft. We had essen-
tially expended all that we had there at the
Proving Ground, but we couldn’t complete
the tests without the Navy F-4s arriving and
they were due to come in, but they hadn’t ar-
rived. I remember we were going to have to
let go of the gun crews and the teams we had
assembled to work together and it was a matter
of great concern. The planes would be arriving
at Phillips Field. I asked the man at the tower,
‘‘Let me know if any of those F-4s come in to-
day because then we can hold the group to-
gether.’’ I told him that the Proof officer would
set it up at whatever the attitude was to be such
as 13 degrees elevation, 20 degrees off an azi-
muth, for example.
Sure enough, late in the morning we get the
call that an F-4 is coming in and I tell him to call
the Proof officer and get it down there at that
particular range. I forgot about it and went back
to my other work.
Well, later in the afternoon therewas a call for
me from the tower. ‘‘Are you Mr. Stein?’’ ‘‘Yes.’’
Well, the fellowon the other side sounded just like
Donald Duck. I mean he was mad. This was a
Navy liaison pilot who had flown that F-4 in
and he went over to the administration building
and was doing his business and when he came
back to get his airplane it was down at the end
of this range sitting 20 degrees up, 13 degrees el-
evation. [Laughter] Luckily we hadn’t started to
shoot at it yet, but he was one mad fellow.
Gene Visco: Art, just a quick question. It
seems tome at this time therewere two different
F-4s. Was this an F-4U (Vought F-4U Corsair) or
an F-4F (Grumman F-4F Wildcat)?
Art Stein: F-4F.
Gene Visco: Do you remember if the wings
were straight and not gull?
Art Stein:Yes. And it had the same Pratt and
Whitney R-2800 engine. Yes, I’m pretty sure. In
fact, I better check now—F-6F. [Editor’s note:
The Grumman F-6F Hellcat replaced the earlier F-
4F Wildcat.] Well, then we had many occasions
where we just barely didn’t commit terrible, ter-
rible errors in the conduct of the tests.
Despite all the variations in our testing and
our goals, the fact that a good number of aircraft
were devoted to obtaining information for ex-
ternal blast tests, we were making good use of
the 1,200 airplanes that had come in.
I must say this and you can see what often
might happen in describing modern scientific
statistical design of experiments. When I had
that estimate for 1,200 airplanes, there was
a meeting of the Scientific Advisory Committee
with many of the people from the Laboratory.
Colonel Simon at that point was talking about
the aircraft vulnerability program. He was talk-
ing about how this was not a hodge-podge pro-
gram, but was scientifically designed from the
very beginning andwe predicted that wewould
need 1,200 airplanes.
Then he turns to me and I’m sitting in the
audience and, ‘‘Mr. Stein, how many airplanes
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did we actually use?’’ ‘‘Oh, we’ve used 1,190.’’
And he turns to the audience and says to them,
‘‘And that’s what you get with statistical de-
sign.’’ [Laughter]
As I said, earlier, I really love him. He was
very good at what I would call scientific sales.
The tests we did were completely different from
the ones that we based an estimate on and we
used all we had and if we had 1,500, then we
would have used 1,500.
Jim Williams: You had mentioned earlier
that you did some kind of comparison of these
tests against actual data from combat.
Art Stein: We had received from the Eighth
Air Force pictures or drawings of B-17s with
holes, the idea being to see where the holes were
and the inference being that if you found certain
sections where there were no holes, that meant
that those particular places were very, very crit-
ical. It was an indirect way of estimating what
parts were critical because no airplanes came
back with hits on those spots.
That was for the B-17s. We had very poor in-
formation except gross information from com-
bat. For example, that over 80 percent of the
airplanes that went downwere aflame and those
were in consonance with the sort of things we
were doing.
However, there was a much more mean-
ingful prediction not made during that time,
but at a later time during the Korean War.
At that time I was at the Cornell Aeronautical
Laboratory and I had become interested in
the total aspect of survivability or evasive ma-
neuvers, countermeasures, total weapons ef-
fectiveness, and the like. We had estimated
what the relative losses would be in fights be-
tween the F-86 (North American F-86 Sabre)
and the MiG-15.
This was before any data was available. We
assessed the fact that there were essentially no
losses with dog fights, per se. If one of the air-
craft wanted to not be hit, he could do so—he
could get away. They didn’t have the ability to
really go after somebody who was trying to
get away and be able to bring him down.
That seemed to have been borne out and, in
fact, most of the kills would occur owing to sur-
prise from a formation of one type by the others
diving in on him, going through them, and then
going away.
When Iwas at Cornell Aeronautical Labora-
tory we had conducted this fuel analysis that I
have just been describing. Tomake the estimate,
we assumed that half the time the F-86 would
see the MiG-15 first and half the time the MiG
would see the F-86 first. The tactic that wasmost
important insofar as losses were concerned
would be to dive through the formation firing
and then after passing the formation, to keep go-
ing. We didn’t have the complexities of the dog
fight to gain more estimates.
I was told by a number of officers that that
was an appropriate assumption. Then the things
thatmade a differencewould be the rate of fire of
the 50 caliberweapons of the F-86, the vulnerable
area of the MiG-15 to those projectiles, where the
opening and the closing range was, and how
much they carried or could carry and might
use in their pass.
Similarly, the 23-mmweapon on theMiG-15
was a higher caliber than the 50 caliber for sure.
But this early version of the 23-mm had a very
low rate of fire and a very poor ballistic coeffi-
cient and the net effect was that during the
two types of attacks by the MiG-15 and the
F-86 and vice versa, we estimated an advantage
of the F-86 of about 8 to 1. It surprised a lot of
people that it was that much. The results were
presented during a keynote speech I gave at
the first Aircraft Passive Defense Conference at
Wright-Patterson. I think it was held around
1950 when I presented the results of that study.
Well, lo and behold, when the war ended,
the losses were totaled up of air-to-air combat
between the F-86 and MiG-15, the ratio was so
much closer to what I had predicted than any
of the errors would be. I mean it was something
like 8.1 instead of the round 8 that we had. The
actual number was extremely close, closer than
they said in the errors. It could have been 8.5 or
even 9, and I would have been very happy. But
8.1 was so close!
So, insofar as that kind of prediction was
concerned it worked out well. You’ve got to ap-
preciate that these were two airplanes that we
knew something about and that we had made
these estimates for.
Jim Williams: I was reading some material
yesterday flying up here. I ran across a reference
that the Germans had installed combat cameras
on their fighters and that they had about
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a thousand sorties worth of combat film footage
that, after the war, apparently found its way here
to Aberdeen, and Herb Weiss had done some
analysis of that. Did you folks use that as well?
Art Stein:Well, it was used to illustrate a dif-
ferent point that I think you would appreciate.
The combat films were matched against the
debriefings of officers after they had returned
from combat. The officer in his debriefing, the
pilot, would typically say, ‘‘I opened fire at say
400 meters and pulled away at 150 meters.’’
Then they would compare it with the camera
film to see what it actually was.
Well, yes indeed, in the first couple of years
or so if he said, ‘‘I opened fire at 400 and pulled
away at 150,’’ maybe it actually was 430 or 320
that he opened and when he pulled away at
150 it might have been 200 or something like
that, but it was in the ballpark.
These first ones occurredwhen therewas no
tail turret on the B-17. Then a tail turret was put
on the B-17. With the addition of the tail turret,
the B-17 apparently seemed much closer to the
fighter coming in. Now when he was debriefed
and he said, ‘‘I opened fire at 400 and pulled
away at 150,’’ what the camera film showed
was that in fact he had opened fire at over
2,000 and pulled away perhaps at 1,200 or
1,500 because somebody was shooting at him.
That, coupled with the fact that some of the pi-
lots toward the latter stages of the war were less
experienced in Europe, caused a very wide var-
iance between the debriefings and the camera
film in contrast to those that were observed ear-
lier during the war.
We’ve often talked, for various types of
weapon delivery, about the comparisons be-
tween testing at Proving Grounds and combat
data, about what the Pucker Factor might be.
In that case you could express the Pucker Factor
in terms of the opening and closing ranges. We
used to use a rule of thumb of something in
the order of 3. That is, the standard deviation
for fire would be degraded to three times what
it would be in Proving Ground testing.
That was your question that I sort of jumped
ahead to. I was waiting to talk about HerbWeiss
and his part of the work. I might as well do so
now.
Let me interject something just to complete
the aspect of the vulnerability studies. The blast
work, external blasts particularly, were done by
other people at the laboratory. These included
Bill (Wilfred) Baker, Jim (James) Sarmousakis,
and Joe Sperrazza; and one of the things we
did in order to get more modern aircraft was
to act like ghouls and try to obtain any crashed
airplane which would be more modern than
the ones we had, anything where a function-
ing portion of the airplane could be useful for
testing.
That’s how we were able to get information
on the vulnerability of integral fuel tanks to in-
ternal bursts by explosive shells. A B-36 (Con-
vair B-36 Peacemaker) went into the lake there
at Dallas/Fort Worth and it was essentially be-
ing junked. When it was pulled out, there were
very large sections that were intact and good. So
we immediately had called to try to see what we
could get of that. There was no way we could
move what was there elsewhere. So we went
there with our explosives and we detonated in-
creasing sizes, from quarter-pound, half-pound,
and so on going up inside within the very large
integral fuel tanks on the B-36. We got a great
deal of information. It was the only information
we had for a long time and that only came about
because of the fact that unfortunately there had
been that accident. That also was a source of in-
formation and data for more modern aircraft
when they had an accident of that type.
Jim Williams: Did you get pretty good
cooperation?
Art Stein: Oh, yes. In fact, everybody there
felt so bad that this happened and there’s such
a loss. The fact that you could retrieve some
good from it and get some information made
them feel a little bit better. Yes, we got good co-
operation.
Now the Air Force was concerned about
this money they were giving to our team. I think
what really stuck in their craw was the fact that
after wewere finishedwith the airplane, we had
it taken away by a scrap contractor, located on
the field, who was paying the Army about an-
other million dollars a year just to dispose of
and to take the scraps.
The people at Eglin then attempted to get
a transfer of our group to Eglin to do this work.
None of the group wanted to leave, but eventu-
ally an additional group was set up at Eglin for
vulnerability work. That was quite a while after
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I had left Aberdeen, but the first attempt was
aborted.
Before leaving the discussion of the aircraft
vulnerability efforts at Aberdeen, I should men-
tion that since the initial start of the group that I
had described with Herb Weiss and two other
folks, the group had grown towhere it included,
as one of the key people, Mr. Morgan Smith,
who had come from the New Mexico School of
Mines to work at the BRL. He was essentially
in charge of all of the fieldwork that was con-
ducted. Mr. Harry Kostiak’s general support
served somewhat as Executive Officer within
the group itself.
Then I had asked a number of fellows, who
were all mathematicians, what their choice
might be. Who wanted to become our expert
on power plants and who wanted fuel systems
and the like because I would then be expecting
that any time I had questions related to those,
they’d be able to come up with the answers.
So we had Roland Bernier in the area of fuel sys-
tems and so on throughout all the subsystems of
the airplane.
Interest was not only on the matter of the
vulnerability of the aircraft being hit, but on
the entire question of weapons selection. In the
Aircraft Weapons Branch the aspects of duels
between aircraft, the questions related to hits
on aircraft, the questions related to the optimum
time to open fire and close fire, were all dealt
with directly by Herb Weiss. He had one or
two other people who would come on board
to assist him. Even though he was the manager
of the entire operation, he nevertheless was very
prolific in writing papers of his own in those
areas.
In this sense, much of what we know today
as being OR has greater similarity to the work
that HerbWeiss did than to what wewere doing
in the aircraft vulnerability part of the group.He
left BRL in 1952 or 1953 to go to Norton and sub-
sequently served on the Army Science Board, on
the Scientific Committee for BRL.
It’s interesting theway inwhichWeiss oper-
ated. He ‘‘felt’’ the correct solutions, initially
intuitively, and then he would proceed to dem-
onstrate them. Often his demonstrations might
not be mathematically rigorous and there were
a number of people around the country who
made it their business to make rigorous the
things that Herb Weiss had observed and had
heuristically demonstrated. This was true in the
Operations EvaluationGroup (OEG) in theNavy
and other places around the country.
During this period, the needs of various or-
ganizations multiplied insofar as aircraft wea-
pons effectiveness was concerned and the
whole question of games and theory.
The Air Force initiated a contract at the In-
stitute for Air Weapons Research at the Univer-
sity of Chicago and these folks were located in
the Museum of Science and Industry in Chi-
cago. That’s where I first had the opportunity
for meeting Clayton Thomas, FS, TomCaywood,
Walt Strauss, Ed Schiller, and the like. They came
to Aberdeen to get orientation with respect to
some of the terminology we were using, e.g.,
what we had found out insofar as the vulnerabil-
ity of aircraft was concerned and weapons effec-
tiveness. They then were to go back and go on
from there pursuing various Air Force-specific
problem areas.
I’ll assume that at some point in the archives
Clayton Thomas will be asked to describe the
activities of that group themselves.
With the expansion of the effort after the
end of World War II, all efforts then were di-
rected toward what the future might be like.
When we got into the Korean War, a number
of other types of problems surfaced. One of
these had to do with the ballistic quality of the
artillery ammunition being used in Korea.
Apparently 40 percent of the 105-mmHow-
itzer rounds fired were fired for observation
rather than for effect. This was extremely high
and was due to the fact that there were so many
small lots at the gun positions. Each time you
changed from one lot number to another you
had to reregister and refire because of the dif-
ferences in ballistics behavior from one lot to
another.
I was asked to go to Joliet and head a group
of ordnance people to serve with people from
Bell Telephone Laboratories who were called
in to attack this problem. It was one of the most
rewarding technical experiences I had.
Rarely does one have the opportunity to
participate in the examination of requirements;
into R&D activities to determine differential
effects and which variables really drive disper-
sion; into matters related to procurement,
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inspection, testing, and evaluation for ballistic
tests, production, and production control; and
one of the most important aspects—distribution.
One of the problems that existed is every time
there would be a distribution point where
ammunition lots were divided among freight
cars and among trucks. At the end there were
very few large lots that would arrive at any one
position.
The average ammunition lot size in those
days was on the order of 9,000 rounds. Yet,
one powder lot alone could serve 150,000 com-
plete rounds of 105-mm Howitzer ammunition.
Within the space of less than two years it was
possible to produce very large lots. The first
large lot was JAA-1. I still remember the lot
number and giving the go ahead for loading
that lot out. In that lot, the dispersion was less
than that which existed in the smaller lots previ-
ously.
Another activity that existed at Joliet, and in
which I found myself being involved more and
more frequently, had to do with the investi-
gation of various problems in the munitions
procurement, aside from this question of the
105-mm Howitzer.
The KoreanWar periodwas one of rapid en-
largement of the production facilities, and the
transfer of people among plants into positions
where they had to learn not only characteristics
for the newmunitions themselves, but also new
methods of manufacturing process control. It
was during the time when there was increasing
emphasis on statistical process control and its
use in the munitions industry.
I recall being asked to go to Kingsbury Ord-
nance Plant in Indiana due to a problem with
the 20-mm ammunition scheduled for use on
the B-36 bomber. There was not one lot accepted
and the causes were several. On the one hand,
lots would be rejected or suspended because
they did not meet bullet pull tests. The round
would be tested in a tensile machine wherein
the cartridge would be pulled one way and
the projectile the other to see how much bullet
pull is required to break the crimp. The bullet
pull had to be controlled within fairly good
limits because if it was too hard you would rup-
ture the case and get erratic muzzle velocities
and also foreign particles in the chamber of
the weapon. If it was not crimped hard enough,
youmight get too low striking velocities or vari-
able striking velocities. So there had to be good
control on bullet pull.
The typical manufacturing process in-
volved one machine wherein the shell and pro-
jectiles would come in along two different belts.
They were weighed. Propellant would drop
down into the cartridge case. The projectile
would sink into the neck of the cartridge case,
pass a crimp bar, and eventually be the com-
plete round.
When I visited the plant I saw a very consci-
entious man hovering around this machine like
a mother hen. Every fewminutes he would pull
from several projectiles, go to his tensile ma-
chine and see what it took to pull it. If the pull
was above the nominal value, even though it
was within the specification on this projectile
that he had collected, he would try to fine-tune
back down to the nominal value in terms of the
pressure on the crimp bar.
If it were below or above that nominal
value, based on those samples of one, he would
maybe make these corrections. In effect, if he
had had a practice that was controlled well
within the two specification limits with a mean
right on the nominal between those two specifi-
cation limits, and the tail of the distribution
reaching out to the lower and upper specifica-
tion limits, he should have left the process alone.
However, due to a random variation, he picked
one sample and said that the sample might be
one or one and a half sigma below or above
the nominal, now he fine-tunes to get that one
random reading back to a nominal. In effect,
he’s shifted the whole distribution now. He’s
thrown a large part of the tail of the distribution
outside its specification limit, where if he’d left
it alone everything would have been fine.
The next time he gets a reading, perhaps in
the other direction, he shifts the distribution the
other way. The effect is that he’s taken the orig-
inal process distribution and broadened it, and
as a result far too large fractions are outside the
specification limits. The lots become suspended,
even though the process was inherently okay.
This overzealous operator should have been
taking larger samples and working with the
means of those samples if he wanted to try to
use them for machine process control. Problems
such as these existed in many of the plants in
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the industry and it became necessary to write in-
structional manuals that could be disseminated
through chief inspectors to their staffs and then
produced within the various companies.
Our greatest moment in that whole activity
came from reports back from the field in Korea
as to the behavior of the 105-mm large lots of
ammunition that were being sent there as a re-
sult of the ballistic quality control project.
We had never expected that the battery
commanders would have the time or inclination
to answer some of our questions regarding the
ammunition. To our surprise, however, we
found they would write reports, some of them
50 to 100 pages long, about their experiences
with this ammunition, how much they liked it,
how much they felt it saved them in terms of
time and effectiveness, and getting on targets.
At no other time did I have the opportunity
to see the results of an R&D activity materialize
in actual combat, and then be recorded upon by
the user the way we did with the 105-mm am-
munition.
Gene Visco: Do you want to talk a little bit
about the international meeting?
Art Stein: To come back to the aircraft vul-
nerability area for the moment, one of the things
that was possible to get initiated quite early in
the process was cooperation among England,
Canada, and the United States in sharing of in-
formation and in working together and coordi-
nating efforts. These were known as working
conferences on aircraft vulnerability.
In the first working conference, for example,
small teams of two to four people were set up to
look at specific problems that the group as
a whole felt should, and could, be examined in
the short time that the group was together, by
pooling the information that various attendees
brought to the meeting.
For example, one group examined the prob-
lem of decompression in cockpits due to holes in
the cockpit, in the canopies, problems related to
pressurized suits, and what effects would be at
different altitudes or different hole sizes. Others
looked at what the needs might be in fuel and
being able to predict the results of fuel fires.
We incorporated the best of what we could
find in the various efforts going on in the three
countries into the proceedings of the working
conferences, which appeared as BRL reports.
Skipping back to the work at the Ordnance
Ammunition Command, experience indicated
the need to build up a competent staff that work
could be delegated to with high trust.
In the 105-mm Howitzer Ballistic Quality
Control Project we found as a result of numbers
of experiments and trials that the sources of dis-
persion in range and muzzle velocity are due
to the shell itself: the rotating band diameter,
the rotating band tighteners, the surface finish,
dynamic unbalance, and to some extent, other
factors relating to the boat tail [Editors’ note: A
boat tail bullet has a slightly tapered base at its rear.].
Insofar as propellant was concerned, there was
a problem related to moisture content, and its
control. Different amounts of ‘‘dry’’ powder
were found in bags even though the total weight
was the same when weighed out.
We found that the moisture content of pow-
ders varied sufficiently so that one could obtain
up to 11 feet per second variation in muzzle ve-
locity from one day to the next. Powder is not
weighed in climate control conditions.
It was necessary to obtain the voluntary co-
operation of the companies producing 105-mm
shells because there was no time for renegotia-
tions of contracts. There were about 20 manu-
facturers of the steel shell using various
processes and they were all paid, and their
products accepted, if they were in conformance
with the original agreement.
However, they could do 100 percent, or de-
tailed inspection on the variables that we had
recognized as being important. They could re-
ject or rework shells that fell outside of the spec-
ification limits, and the net result of all that
being a fairly uniform distribution within the
specification limits rather than the more ideal
normal distribution peaked near the center
and tailing out at the specification limits.
To obtain this voluntary compliance and to
apprise the industry of how it was doing vis-a`-
vis other members of the industry, I took it upon
myself to publish a newsletter. I sent it around to
the various companies and I indicated howmany
shells were rated A, B, or C in terms of quality
from the standpoint of ballistic uniformity for each
of the shell characteristics that we had found to be
important and that were impacting on dispersion.
Some of the companies responded very
quickly and were producing the AA rated shell
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within less than a month after the program was
started. However, this was not true of all and, in
particular, one company called me. The presi-
dent called me to complain that his company’s
C rating had been disseminated to the rest of
the industry through this newsletter.
I told him that we had received a number of
requests from people who wanted to know how
they were doing vis-a`-vis the others and we felt
we were providing a service. However, if he
didn’t want to be included, we wouldn’t in-
clude him and just make a note that the Such
and Such Company didn’t want to be included.
He said, ‘‘That’s blackmail,’’ and I said, ‘‘But it’s
true, isn’t it?’’ I said, ‘‘But why should we have
this argument regarding whether or not one is
included in the letter when it would be so easy
for you to always have gotten the highest rat-
ing?’’ I said, ‘‘I understand how this has come
about and if I could speak to you I think you
would agree that this was possible and also de-
sirable.’’ I visited this company CEO and de-
scribed how much we thought of the capability
of his plant manager, who had written a number
of articles in Machine Design. The articles dis-
cussed how to control diameters using lathes
versus centerless grinders, and how much he
could obtain at a lathe. And it was true, he could
get more at a lathe than others seemed to be able
to, but they did not and could not produce as
well as some of those grinders did.
It seemed that it was about time to move to-
ward the use of the centerless grinder, which
they did, and that enabled them to produce
the highest score of the ammunition in the field.
We had a number of those instances where
for one reason or another it was necessary to
persuade the people involved. I found, for ex-
ample, that foundry workers, who were a breed
apart from all other men, had been very difficult
to convince or to have any concerns at all about
what the shell ratings per se were, or any of the
other advice. But when explained to them in
terms of the impact poor dispersion had on in-
creasing numbers of casualties, it meant a great
deal to them and their complete cooperation was
obtained. They were eager to participate and
make suggestions as to how to improve the
weight and cavity of the projectiles, which had
determined the piercing operation of the bullets
that they started with.
Similarly, we had problems with the largest
shell plant, which was producing almost as
much as the rest of the industry together. It
was possible to demonstrate that one man on
a centerless grinding operation could handle
both the rough and finished grind and would
have little or no inspection if he was able to in-
corporate the suggested process-control proce-
dures. There was a great deal of opposition
initially from the plant manager who said, ‘‘Ei-
ther you fellows show me how you could save
me money and I produce the same quality, or
how I can improve my quality and not cost me
any more.’’ He said, ‘‘But I don’t believe any
of this quality control stuff.’’
Well, we had selected the centerless grind-
ing operation and were able to demonstrate
these savings. Their process had a line going
past each of the 12 banks of rough and finished
grinders and on this belt would go many, many
shells to the ‘‘hospital’’ for rework and there was
a great deal of scrap produced in the way in
which they had been operating. Hewas skeptical
of savings until after using our process-control
system design to remove the scrap. It turned
out that after a full day’s operation there were
just three pieces that were slightly oversized.
The plant manager was completely won over.
The 12 banks were operated three shifts
a day. Each grinder had an operator and there
was an inspector for each. By going through
an inspection scheme where they would leave
the process alone and not measure again for five
minutes, it was possible to have the same in-
spector operate two of the banks with no diffi-
culty whatsoever. The reset limits were based
on new, medium, or old wheels in terms of the
rate of trending that you get with the wear on
thewheel and the processwas very easy to adapt.
The addition of the two readings, the sum,
which was in effect the average of two, the dif-
ference between them was the range, which
was an estimate of the dispersion, and all the
operator had to do was to put in the numbers,
the sum or the difference of the two and if they
were higher or lower than the reset limits, then
he reset, otherwise let it go for five minutes.
The plant manager liked the savings in
personnel somuch that it turned out hewanted
to use the same system on all the other opera-
tions in the plant. This is where he ran into
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trouble because while the people from the cen-
terless grinding operation could be distributed
among some of the others, there came the point
where there just were too many people and
some peoplewould have to be let go. The union
objected to the whole procedure that was pro-
ducing these results. The plant manager felt
he had less trouble staying with the old system
than to buck the union on this issue.
At the same time, there was a problem at
one of the well-known wheel companies that
was making the 105-mm Howitzer shell. There
the union had a grievance and complained that
the system should be used throughout the plant,
not just on artillery shells. Their menwere being
paid on an incentive basis based on how many
good pieces they made in a day. The process
controls that were put in for the 105-mm How-
itzer resulted in those menmaking more money
than the others in the plant. This resulted in dis-
satisfaction to the degree that they insisted that
theArmy help themput in the same kind of con-
trols on everything that they did there in the
plant, not just the 105s.
The period was very interesting. Many in-
teresting side problems were examined, such
as how to detect whether operators were eager
or shied away from finding a defect that would
reject a large lot of ammunition or which would
shut down a line. There had been indications
that some inspectors would shy away from
reaching that decision point, and others would
leap forward and were only too eager to find
the serious impacts on their operation. We
found it very interesting regarding the statistical
methods that were used to separate these out.
All and all it was a very active period, both
in the growth of quality-assurance methods
generally and the use of analytical techniques
in the control of the internal operations in the
firm. This had to do with the examination of dif-
ferent vendors, whether they were responsible
for the outgoing quality of the plant, how much
was contributed internally within the plant,
how tomanage a quality-control operationmost
effectively, and ultimately how to write govern-
ment specifications so that the government could
receive a product that had been produced under
process control.
In October 1955, after quite a bit of discus-
sion on the part of various companies, RAND,
Cornell Lab, University of Chicago, and others,
I decided to join Cornell.
The areas of aircraft vulnerability and sys-
tems analysis really broadened after I joined
Cornell Lab. I was involved with all aspects of
aircraft survivability and the examination of re-
quirements for tactical air as well as tactical
ground operations.
However, by this time the entire area of op-
erations research had expanded significantly
and was much more well-known insofar as the
public record is concerned. So I’ll stop here in
1955.
In thinking back about those early days and
the various activities in which I have been in-
volved, it would appear that those activities re-
lated to the sampling inspections and process
control have continued development along very
much the lines that we had been implementing
within ordnance.
However, when it comes to thematter of op-
erations research with respect to certain optimi-
zation problems, questions related to aircraft
vulnerability and weapons effectiveness, I be-
lieve that we have both gained and lost some-
thing with the advent of the computer.
What we have gained, of course, is the abil-
ity to tackle complex problems and to do so
with far more different types of cases than
would have been possible otherwise. Many of
these could only be solved by numerical means
and the computer has enabled the whole area
of finite element analysis to be used for the de-
piction and explanation of complex interactive
events.
It is, however, also true that the tool has
sometimes obscured the object that was being
fashioned and that we find many modelers
and analysts who do not have a great deal of
subject matter knowledge. They cannot recog-
nize the reasonableness of some of the outputs
that occur, the difficulties or means whereby ap-
propriate inputs would be obtained, and the
loss of ability to analytically conduct at least
bounding investigations to see how worthwhile
it is to go into a large-scale examination.
We have seen people react to a new problem
somewhat like Pavlov’s dogs and immediately
start to model the problem without thinking
through, at least for a few hours, as to whether
it was possible to determine a much more
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general appropriate solution analytically. Or as I
sometimes have said to people, ‘‘How would
you do the job assuming you didn’t have a com-
puter available to you? What would you do to
give me the answer tomorrow? What would
you do to give me the answer next week if you
didn’t have a computer available to you?’’ I have
found that just in thinking through those
methods, people have foundmore efficient ways
of employing the computer rather than brute
force, head-on attempted simulation.
It was very interesting to us to find the de-
gree to which we could impact, by analysis, the
operation of extremely serious problems relating
to the survival of our personnel and equipment
and the effectiveness of our operations.
Little did we dream then that the entire area
of operations research and management science
would mushroom to the degree that it did from
a group that may have numbered no more than
50 or 100 working nationally.
DUSA(OR) PROJECT INTERVIEW OF
DR. ANNETTE STEIN
Dr. Jim Williams
US Army Military History Institute
INTRODUCTION
Dr. Annette Steinwas thewife ofMr. Arthur
Stein, FS, the third President of MORS. Annette
Stein was one of the human ‘‘computers’’ dur-
ing World War II and worked for Dr. John von
Neumann. Von Neumann, a true polymath,
was famous for being a principal member of
the Manhattan Project and for the development
of game theory and the digital computer, among
numerous other accomplishments. Dr. Stein re-
ceived her PhD from the University of Buffalo
and then taught on the faculty at Buffalo State
College for 15 years, specializing in diagnosis
and remediation for children and psychomet-
rics, the measurement of their abilities and dis-
abilities. Dr. Stein is now a Professor Emeritus
at Buffalo State College. This interview was
sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Under
Secretary of the Army (Operations Research),
DUSA(OR). The interview was conducted on
June 5, 1992 at Dr. Stein’s home in Williamsville
(near Buffalo), New York.
Jim Williams: Dr. Stein, I’d like to ask you
just to give a little bit about your background,
where you were born, raised, and that sort of
thing.
Annette Stein: I was born in New York City
and grew up there. Most of the time I lived in
the Bronx, and I went to school there. I went to
Hunter College, which at that timewas a college
for women and was also in a growth period; so
my first semester I went to school at Number 2
Park Avenue, an office building in downtown
New York. Then we went to the new Bronx
Campus, so I was able to walk to school from
home and I was there for a year and a half. Then
the newest of the buildings, the one that was
erected on 68th Street and Park Avenue, was
ready and I attended there for the second two
years. I was a member of the first graduating
class from that particular building.
I was an English and journalismmajor and I
studiously avoided taking courses that I didn’t
particularly enjoy. I took the required courses
in math. I did not take any education courses.
I really didn’t take any of the difficult science
courses either. I had physiology and anthropol-
ogy and all kinds of good things like that, a lot of
economics and political science, and I thought I
had a pretty well-rounded bachelor of arts.
Jim Williams: Did you enjoy anthropology?
Annette Stein: Yes. I had a wonderful pro-
fessor, Dr. Elizabeth Keuer. She was married
to an archeologist who was on the faculty of
Columbia University and the two of them
would spend their summers in the Southwest
on various archeological digs. I was very fortu-
nate I thought, and still do, to have been invited
to her home one time for afternoon tea and I was
really impressed. Her homewas beautiful and it
was filled with treasures of Native American
art. I had known that she had wonderful silver
and turquoise jewelry because she always wore
them to school and there were always different
pieces—beautiful belts and squash blossom
necklaces—just marvelous. I took her courses
in 1939 and I graduated from Hunter in 1941.
The art of the American Southwest really
was not very well known in a big city like
New York at that time. It later became very
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popular. But when I went to her home for tea I
was overwhelmed by the beautiful artifacts that
she had, rugs on the walls and on the floors, and
pottery. It was just like being in an informal mu-
seum. That was the beginning of my interest
in things like that. So imagine what a thrill it
was when Arthur returned from a trip to New
Mexico some years later after we’d been mar-
ried for about six years, and he had a pair of sil-
ver and turquoise earrings for me and several
small pots from the Pueblo Indians, which we
still have today.
That was the beginning of a love affair with
the Indians of the Southwest and we’ve returned
many times and we keep adding to our small
collection. They are a continuing source of real
pleasure and joy, I think for both of us, but I
know for me.
Jim Williams: When did you get married?
Annette Stein: We were married December
28, 1941. Actually we had originally planned
to be married over the Thanksgiving holiday.
Arthur was already working at Aberdeen Prov-
ing Ground, Maryland, and so our plan was to
be married at Thanksgiving time. He would be
home for a long weekend, home meaning New
York, but he was not able to get any housing
for us until the end of December. We delayed
our wedding and we were married, instead, De-
cember 28. We didn’t expect that between those
two dates that we would have the beginning of
our involvement in the war with the bombing
of Pearl Harbor.
Jim Williams: What is your recollection
about the Pearl Harbor bombing?
Annette Stein:Well, Arthur was home for the
weekend and he got tickets for a New York
Giants football game at the Polo Grounds. I
guess that doesn’t exist anymore—no, it’s gone.
[Laughter] But at any rate, we were at the foot-
ball game and there was an aura of excitement
all through the game, as there usually is, but
then something different became apparent after
a while. For one thing, on the public address
system there were calls made for General Some-
body and Colonel Somebody, and the name that I
remember hearing was a Colonel Doolittle and
these people were asked to report to the office
and that seemed a little bit ominous. But we re-
ally didn’t know what had happened, though
we knew something had occurred. We didn’t
know what it was until the game was over. We
left the stadium and by the time we got to the
street we heard that Pearl Harbor had been
bombed and we could hardly believe that.
I remember so well the next day when I was
at work. I was working for a printing company
at the time and everything stopped when Pres-
ident Roosevelt made a speech on the radio.
We all listened to it and I don’t think I’ll ever for-
get that particular day and how people looked
and how frightenedwewere. It was such a scary
thing for us. It was an experience that you’re not
likely to forget. So that was where I was. I was at
a football game when the bombing occurred
and heard officers being called. There were
a lot of officers at that football game. Then the
next day at work everything stopped so that
we could all listen to the President.
Jim Williams: You said that it came as quite
a shock. What do you recall about the build-
up though? The war, of course, had been going
on in Europe for some time and I would expect
in New York City folks were pretty well aware
at least of some things that were going on.
Annette Stein: Oh, surely, but somehow the
idea that the Japanese would fly over Pearl Har-
bor and bomb our Navy—I don’t think that had
occurred to anyone as a possibility, certainly not
to me. Of course, I guess I was pretty young at
the time. I was just 20 and even though I was
very much aware of the war in Europe and very
sad and worried about that, somehow I never
expected that we’d have such a terrible thing
happen to us at Pearl Harbor. It’s hard to believe
even now, even though I’ve been there several
times and stood right there at the monument
over the sunken ship.
Jim Williams: You went to Aberdeen at the
end of December then, when you were married
and when Art was able to get housing?
Annette Stein: Right.
JimWilliams:And youwere there some time
before youwent to work at the Proving Ground?
Annette Stein: Yes, I guess I was there for
about three months. We had ordered our furni-
ture in New York City over that Thanksgiving
Day weekend and because we were young
and inexperienced, and I guess a little bit stupid
about money, Arthur had paid for our furniture
before it was delivered. [Laughter] I guess there
was no real compulsion on the part of the dealer
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to see to it that it got to us because he already
had his money. But what it meant was that we
waited for almost three months until all of the
furniture was delivered. The day after we ar-
rived in Aberdeen our box spring and mattress
were delivered to the house and that’s all we got
for a month. We had that sitting on the floor in
the bedroom on top of the packing cartons that
they had come in and that was the extent of
our furnishings.
We had a very kind neighbor who lent us
a card table and two chairs so that we had
a place to eat. Also, when we had come down,
my mother had packed some essentials that
she was sure we would have to have when we
got there and so we had some linens, a down
comforter, pillows, and a little radio. We carried
all of that with us wrapped in boxes with our
suitcases on the Pennsylvania Railroad down
to Aberdeen. I guess we must have looked like
immigrants getting off the train. [Laughter] But
I was very grateful that we had those things
with us, otherwise I don’t knowwhat wewould
have done those first few weeks.
Jim Williams: Did you live on post?
Annette Stein: No, we had wartime housing
just off the post, adjacent to the post in an area
called SwanMeadows and these were small du-
plex houses. That is, there were two units in one
building. They were single-story houses with-
out a basement and in the kitchen we had
a hand-stoked coal furnace and a gas water
heater that was not automatic. You had to light
it with a match and remember to turn it off after
an hour, otherwise it would start hissing steam.
This was really interesting because both Arthur
and I grew up in apartments in New York City.
A furnace was something in the basement of the
apartment house and hot water came out of the
water faucets and we never had to think about
where it was coming from.
We had another kind of situation in the
house. We had a coal bin outside the kitchen
and we had to remember at night to stoke the
furnace and be sure to dampen it after the new
coals were going; otherwise, we’d get up in
the morning and we’d have a cold house and
that happened because we didn’t always re-
member. [Laughter] We also had to remember
to light the hot water heater and to turn it off,
but we didn’t always remember to turn it off.
So we frequently had scalding water hissing
out of the faucets, but, you know, these were mi-
nor inconveniences. It was an adventure. It really
was. We loved our little house. We planted
flowers and trees and cut the grass. It was just
so different from growing up in an apartment
house in New York City and, besides, we were
newlyweds. Even a hand-stoked coal furnace
was not too much of a chore.
Jim Williams:Were those housing units built
just for the people that worked at the Proving
Ground?
Annette Stein: That’s right. We were very
lucky to get one of those units because shortly
afterward they were all occupied and other
housing was built at a greater distance from
the Proving Ground. They weren’t nearly as
nice either, if you can imagine something that
was not nearly as nice as a house with the fur-
nace and the water heater in the kitchen. But
we had the most elegant accommodations that
were available at the time.
Jim Williams: Were the people who lived in
the other units people that worked at Ballistics
Research Laboratory (BRL) as well?
Annette Stein: No, they didn’t work at the
Lab. Two of the women worked at the Proving
Ground, but not at BRL, and the neighbors on
the other side were Army people—a sergeant
and his wife and child. It was a very congenial
community. We all got along and enjoyed each
other.
Jim Williams: When did you actually go to
work at BRL?
Annette Stein:After about three months. Ev-
erything was delivered. We had curtains up on
the windows. I guess I had washed the win-
dows and waxed the floors just as many times
as they needed to be done and I felt I could leave
my house safely and go find a job.
I told you earlier that I had been an English
and journalism major in college. I thought that I
might get a position on the Proving Ground in
the Public Relations Office. And one fine day I
went to the personnel office and told themwhat
I was interested in and I was told that there re-
ally weren’t any openings in public relations,
but did I say I had a college degree? And I said,
‘‘Yes.’’ He said, ‘‘Well, do you have any college
math?’’ I said, ‘‘Yes, the required course.’’ ‘‘Well,
we’ll send you over to Ballistics Research
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Laboratory to see Dr. Dederick.’’ And off I went.
Of course I had heard about Dr. Dederick from
Arthur. I felt just a little bit intimidated. I was
out of my depth.
Dr. Dederick also askedmewhatmath I had
had in college and I told him the one required
three-hour course as a freshman, some calculus
and trigonometry, and I don’t know what else. I
got an A, but that was all I had. He said, ‘‘You
know, that really isn’t very much.’’ I said, ‘‘I
agree.’’ He said, ‘‘Stein, are you related to
Arthur Stein?’’ ‘‘Yes, I’m his wife.’’ He said, ‘‘Well,
it really isn’t enough math, but maybe Arthur
can teach you at night.’’ So I got a job and I was
hired to be a computer. And I knew what a com-
puter was then. A computer was somebodywho
worked on a calculating machine and did com-
putations, but today if you tell somebody that
you were a computer, that’s really pretty funny.
There were many female computers, mostly
young women who had started within, about
six months of the time that I started and some
within a few months after I did. Most of them
were graduates of very nice women’s colleges
in the South and it was my first introduction to
many different southern accents. I became very
adept at distinguishing between North and
South Carolina as against Alabama, as against
Mississippi, but all of these youngwomen—they
were all about my age. I was 20 at the time and
they were anywhere from 20 to 22 years old.
There was one woman from Boston. I remember
her well. We were good friends.
Jim Williams: Had these women that had
come from the South been specifically recruited
to come up there? Do you know how they came
to be there?
Annette Stein: I’m really not sure, but all of
these women were math majors and they all
had much more extensive backgrounds in math
than I did—obviously anybody had more than I
did. But they were math majors and I will say
that even though I wasn’t a math major, there
was nothing that I had to do that required me
to use anything that was beyond what I could
do or what I had learned in my one college
course. It was fairly routine work and we had,
for example, bombing tables that we filled in.
We had formulas. We had data and we worked
the calculating machines. It was a question of
accuracy and speed, and I guess I was just as
accurate and just as speedy as the math majors.
[Laughter]
But the interesting thing was that when we
would finish one of these enormous sheets, we
would bring it to a supervisor, Elvin Martin. I
was always amazed at the way he would take
this sheet and run his finger up and down the
columns and out of these thousands of numbers
if there was one that was wrong, he’d find it and
it would take just a few minutes for him to do
this. At that time I had a hard time understand-
ing how hewas able to do that. Of course in later
years I was involved in checking the work of
college students at the college where I was
teaching. When I reviewed their test results that
they had done from testing children, I could im-
mediately spot numbers that didn’t look right.
At that point I frequently thought back to the
days at BRL when Elvin Martin would go up
and down those columns in lickety-split time
and find an error, if indeed there was one. You
have an expectation for what is to be there and
if something is not right, it stands out. But I
was impressed when I watched him do it.
I guess I worked on bombing tables for
about a year and even for a nonmath major like
me, it got to be boring. Not only that, wewere so
busy during that year, there was so much work
to be done and there wasn’t enough space or
machines. It wasn’t a question of getting more
people because there was no place to put them.
We had shifts: there was night shift and there
was swing shift and therewas day shift. I can re-
member coming home from the night shift,
walking down Liberty Street from the Doodle-
bug [Editor’s note: the Doodlebug was a self-
propelled railcar], the railroad that used to take
us into the Proving Ground. And as I’mwalking
down the street to my house, Arthur would be
walking up the street to the Doodlebug to go
in and we’d say, ‘‘Hi, there.’’
Jim Williams: The Doodlebug was —
Annette Stein: The Doodlebug was the little
train that ran from town and made a stop at
Swan Meadows and went all the way into the
Proving Ground. It made stops along the way.
We didn’t have a car then and you couldn’t
get a car then. So we were really very fortunate
that we lived so close to the Doodlebug. It was
the equivalent of about a three-block walk to
the railroad to pick it up. But when I was
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working night shift it was really amusing to be
coming home andArthur would be going off to
work and we’d meet on Liberty Street.
Jim Williams: Did you folks have any days
off or anything like that, or was this a seven
days-a-week job?
Annette Stein: No. It was a five days-a-week
job. We did have weekends and I think we were
two weeks on a shift and then we’d go to an-
other shift. I was only on night shift two weeks
out of six. The swing shift wasn’t as bad, but
there were two aspects: I guess I was getting
tired of the shift and I was also getting bored
with the work. I asked if I could be transferred
to do something a little bit different. That was
when Iwent to work for Dr. Alex Charters in Ex-
terior Ballistics. I did some calculations there,
but I also did some other things. They had pic-
tures of projectiles that we used to make mea-
surements of the shock waves and of the wave
lengths along the projectile.
I have to tell you that I didn’t truly under-
stand what I was doing or why, but I did it well.
[Laughter] Again, it was work that was precise
and required accuracy and I enjoyed doing it.
It was a change from just doing calculations
and it was also an opportunity to do two differ-
ent kinds of tasks rather than the same thing all
the time. I found that much more pleasant. This
is where I had the rare experience of meeting
and working for Dr. John von Neumann, who
was on the Scientific Advisory Committee for
the Laboratory. Of course, I had heard Arthur
talking about the Scientific Advisory Commit-
tee and I knew who many of the people were,
but I didn’t know them personally. Dr. von
Neumann was a legendary name and I was a
little bit apprehensive about doing work for
him, but he was really a very sweet and very
gentle man.
After I had done some calculations and
some measurements for him, he used to ask
for me to do tasks at other times when he came.
That was very flattering, very pleasing. He was,
as I say, really such a nice man. Then I’d hear
Arthur’s stories about meetings that he was at
with Dr. von Neumann and some of the funny
stories that he had to tell. That was a whole other
dimension because that was not the Dr. von
Neumann that I knew. But I did know that he
was truly a very special person and it was nice
to know that I was doing something for a very
brilliantman, especially since I really didn’t have
very much in the way of qualifications except
that I was a careful and meticulous worker.
Jim Williams: Did you still do computations
for Dr. von Neumann?
Annette Stein: Yes. He’d bring things for me
to do and he’d tell mewhat to do and Iwould do
them. So, the human computer. [Laughter]
Jim Williams: Did this require you to learn
more math?
Annette Stein: Not really. You know, I never
could really understand why we computers had
to bemathmajors—Iwas the notable exception—
because we didn’t need to know very much to
do the job. I will say this, there was no way that
I would ever go beyond the rather menial tasks
that I was doing, whereas there were other
womenwhowere able to advance because they
did know what they were doing.
Jim Williams: Was there much opportunity
for advancement for women in your section at
that time?
Annette Stein:Not much. As a matter of fact,
I think that at the time I was there, only one
woman had professional rank. All the rest of
us were subprofessionals. I didn’t deserve to
be anything but a subprofessional, but there
were people there who were capable, knowl-
edgeable, and well-trained and they still didn’t
have professional rank. At the time it seemed
tomegrossly unfair and looking back, it certainly
does. After awhile therewere a couple ofwomen
of professional rank. One of them was Dr. Jane
Dewey. She was at the Laboratory. I think she
came to work there after I left. I worked for two
years and then I became pregnant, and in those
days you really didn’t work up until two days
before your baby was born. I left when I was
three months pregnant and never returned. I
was a happy housewife and mother.
Jim Williams: Art was drafted, or enlisted,
and went into the Army for a period of time.
Did you stay there at Aberdeen through all that
period?
Annette Stein: Yes. He was drafted. He was
under 26 and he did try to enlist in the Navy.
He had a commission that was promised to
him. He met the people he was going to work
with andwas shown his desk. It was all very ex-
citing, but was not to be because when he was
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inducted into the Army there were papers at ev-
ery step of the way that said that he was going
back to Aberdeen; and that’s what happened.
I’m not complaining because we were together
and he got back to Aberdeen about two weeks
before our daughter was born. So that was
a comfort. He had several port calls after that
and his possessions were shipped out a couple
of times, but somehow or other he never did
go and he was at Aberdeen most of the time.
We stayed in our little house on Liberty Street
and both of our children were born there and
we lived there for a total of 10 years—and they
were 10 good years. The house was very inade-
quate, but we were happy there.
Jim Williams: Did you leave the house on
Liberty Street because your husband left BRL
or did you move out for other reasons?
Annette Stein:Well, we had been looking for
a house to buy for some time and we hadn’t
found just the right thing. Then Arthur was
transferred to Joliet, Illinois and wemoved to Il-
linois. We lived in Park Forest for three and
a half years while he was at Joliet. Then when
he was ready to leave Joliet, a big decision was
whether to go back to Aberdeen to BRL or to
go to Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory here in
Buffalo. It was not an easy decision to make
and I know thatArthur vacillated.Hehad ahard
time making up his mind, and I remember that
we drove down to Aberdeen and we looked
around. Even though we had been very happy
for our 10 years there, after having spent three
and a half years in Illinois in a different kind
of community, we were no longer in what was
essentially a company town. We were living in
a community with people from many different
walks of life and I liked that. I also liked the
proximity to Chicago and the things that it
had to offer in the way of cultural activities;
not that Baltimore didn’t have any, but I think
it was mainly the idea of living in a community
with a varied population rather than people
who were mainly Proving Ground people.
We could have lived in Baltimore and
Arthur could have commuted, but that just
seemed like a lot of traveling. Even his commut-
ing from Park Forest to Joliet was less than it
would have been from Baltimore to Aberdeen.
We came here to Buffalo and looked things over
here and we made the decision to come here.
There are many ways of looking at a decision.
I’ve always believed that once youmake up your
mind you need to be happy with your decision
and not look back and say, ‘‘Well, what if?’’ I
don’t think that’s productive. We really had
a hard time deciding, but once we decided, the
die was cast andwewere really very happy here.
There were good schools for the children, and
there was an opportunity for me to go back to
school and I went to the University of Buffalo. I
had a Johnny-come-lately career, which was nice
too. I did that after the children were in high
school. That’s when I started to go to school my-
self so I didn’t have to have guilt feelings about
neglecting them. That sounds funny today, be-
cause today women with small children work
and have their careers. But in the 1940s and the
1950s that was not the usual thing. I knew that
my obligation was to be a mother and a wife full
time and it was when we were in Illinois that I
got my first part-time job. I saw an ad in the
newspaper for a copy editor for a publishing
company, and I got the job editing college-level
textbooks in economics and management. It
was very good for my self-esteem to have a job
that somebody was willing to pay me for after
all those years and one that I felt qualified to
do. I didn’t have to say, ‘‘Well, all I’ve had are
three hours of college journalism,’’ because I’d
had 60 hours of college journalism, literature,
and writing. I felt qualified and that was good.
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